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Abstract
In this research, the problem of software protection and the attributes that
define that protection is considered. Specifically, how to protect programs defined
as structural combinational logic gates. Obfuscation is one technique for protecting
such circuits and involves replacing an original circuit with a functionally equivalent
variant that has some definable hiding property. The difficulty of reverse engineering
versus identifying and recovering the original components or sub-circuits within an
original circuit is compared. With a polymorphic circuit engine that produces seman-
tically equivalent variations of standard benchmark circuits the level of component
hiding across variants with different physical configurations is determined to provide
an entropy-based attribute to assess whether components are merged at the structural
level. Specific types of obfuscating transformations with respect to component hiding
using ancestral entropy are compared as well as the measure of uncertainty related to
origination of a gate within a circuit.
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Characterizing Component Hiding Using Ancestral
Entropy
I. Introduction
Current military operations have United States military assets and technologiesspread throughout the world. Many of these operations include multinational
forces with access to U.S. equipment. Agreements with our allies and the Department
of Defense (DoD) contractors to participate in foreign sales, the loss or capture of
military assets, and overseas computer product fabrication increase the risk of our
adversaries reverse engineering U.S. equipment. To reduce access to information,
the DoD has established an anti-tamper (AT) policy to protect U.S. assets. DOD
5200.1-M defines the processes by which information, technologies and systems that
are essential to the successful development of new DoD systems are identified and
protected. Essential Program Information Technologies, and/or Systems (EPITS)
are the critical elements of a system that make it unique and valuable to the U.S.
defense forces. The EPITS are those items that would cause degradation of combat
effectiveness, shorten the lifetime, or allow a foreign activity to neutralize a U.S.
system [5]. To protect this critical information, the U.S. military uses a wide variety
of AT techniques.
1.1 Scope
This thesis uses a circuit variant creator to mask the physical appearance of cir-
cuit components to complicate particular reverse engineering efforts. Entropy serves
to identify if a gate from a circuit or sub-circuit variant is derived from a specific
component of the original circuit.
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1.2 Problem Definition
Software and hardware obfuscation is essential when designing critical equip-
ment that an adversary may obtain. The DoD budgeted over 75 billion dollars for
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) in 2008 [4]. When an ad-
versary doesn’t have to spend the time or money to develop equivalent equipment,
the financial investment in developing the equipment and any time is shortened. If
an adversary has complete or partial access to DoD equipment or designs they gain
information the DoD didn’t intend them to have. Just a few examples are both new
and old technologies, U.S. military and commercial design strategies, and information
gathering techniques. Below, several examples illustrate this very thing.
1.2.1 Airframes. During WWII, Joseph Stalin refused to allow American
B-29 aircraft to land in Russia because they were not at war with Japan and did
not want to fight a war on two fronts. Unfortunately, several U.S. crews were forced
to divert to Russia and land after completing bombing missions on Japan and the
aircraft and crew were detained by the Russians. The crew were eventually returned,
but three B-29 Superfortresses, two damaged and one completely in tact, were kept
by Russia and never returned. Stalin thought after the war that he would need long
range bomber capability to reach North America to prevent any aggression from the
Americans. Estimating it would take five years to develop his own long range aircraft,
he copied the B-29 bolt for bolt [11], saving development time and money. The B-39
Superfortress is shown in the top half of Figure 1.1; the bottom half is the Russian
Tu-4.
One Russian military aircraft that bears a striking resemblance to U.S. aircraft
is the Tu-160 long range bomber. As Figure 1.2 shows, both aircraft have the same
basic shape, size, and both have variable-sweep wings. Although many aircraft are
designed to counter a threat from an adversary, it is most likely no coincidence that
the resulting aircraft appear so similar.
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Figure 1.1: B-29 and Tu-4
Figure 1.2: B-1 Lancer and Tu-160 BlackJack
1.2.2 Spacecraft. Another example of U.S. developed equipment copied by
our adversaries is the NASA Space Shuttle. The Russian Buran orbiter is strikingly
similar to the U.S. version, as shown in Figure 1.3. The Russians copied as much
from the American version of the space shuttle as possible to guarantee the successful
development of the Buran orbiter [20]. Not surprisingly, the Russians also copied the
U.S. idea for transporting the orbiter. As Figure 1.4 illustrates, the Russians used
the AN-225 MYIRA aircraft to transport their orbiter where NASA uses a modified
Boeing 747.
1.2.3 Hainan Island. In 2001 a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft and a
Chinese Shenyang J-8 collided in international airspace approximately 70 miles from
the Chinese island of Hainaan. Due to the damage from the accident, the EP-3 was
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Figure 1.3: U.S. Shuttle and Russian Buran
Figure 1.4: Spacecraft in Transport
forced to make an emergency landing on Hainaan Island. The crew was released
after 12 days, but the aircraft was in the hands of the Chinese for a total of 94 days.
According to a UPI press release [10], the EP-3 couldn’t have landed at a better place
for China and a worse place for U.S. military intelligence,
“Hainan island is host to one of China’s largest electronic-signals-intelligence
complexes and is manned by experts who can glean critical information
on the aircraft’s capabilities if they gain access to the Navy’s EP-3...”
Pentagon sources said.
It is unknown what information the Chinese learned from having access to this re-
connaissance aircraft, but this is a prime example of why anti-tamper measures are
essential. Effective hardware and software protection need to be developed to protect
U.S. technologies.
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1.3 Reverse Engineering Legality
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 (SCPA) stipulates that copying
all or part of a chip for purposes of analyzing its layout is legal. However, simply
copying a design is illegal. For copying to be legal, the reverse engineered chip must
be substantially different than the original. For the chip manufacturer to protect the
product, it is in their best interest to design it with a reverse engineer in mind, keeping
the layout as difficult to understand as possible [18]. Although the law doesn’t apply
internationally and will not be respected by our military adversaries, it is important
to follow this guidance to protect U.S. financial investments and military technologies.
The SCPA sets the stage for research in circuit level obfuscation and circuit component
hiding to increase the difficulty of reverse engineering U.S. technology.
1.4 Goals and Hypothesis
If an adversary attempts to reverse engineer a circuit variant, how can the dif-
ficulty of this effort in comparison to the reverse engineering the original circuit be
characterized? If a new gate is introduced into a circuit derived from two independent
circuits or sub-circuits, what is the level of difficulty for the reverse engineer to undo
this transformation? An analysis of circuit transformations is performed on function-
ally equivalent circuits to define a measure of hiding specific circuit components. The
first goal of this research is to define the term component hiding. Commonly used
and easily identifiable components or sub-components of a circuit are identified and
their structure changed to increase the difficulty of reverse engineering. Hiding these
components is critical to thwarting some reverse engineering techniques. The second
goal of this thesis is to compare circuit transformations that create circuit variants to
identify component hiding properties. The third goal is to define an attribute that
reflects the obfuscating properties a circuit variant provides. This protects programs
from being easily copied and protects the DoD’s financial investment as well as in-
creasing the level of difficulty for our adversaries to reverse engineer U.S. military
technology. Can this be accomplished using a polymorphic circuit engine based on
5
iterative selection and replacement? Can the uncertainty of component identification
and the work required by an adversarial reverse engineer be measured? To test this
different circuit configurations are used, how sub-circuits are merged by different se-
lection and replacement algorithms and de-merged via a circuit reduction program is
investigated.
1.5 Organization
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II provides the background research
and sets the stage for this research effort. Chapter III describes in detail the method
used to perform the experiments. Chapter IV describes the results of the experiments.
Chapter V summarizes the contributions of this thesis and discusses future work in
this research area. Appendix A contains figures illustrating the results of three gate
replacement experiments performed using series circuits. Appendix B contains figures
illustrating the results of three gate replacement experiments performed using parallel
circuits. Appendix C contains figures illustrating the results of experiments performed
using four gate replacement algorithms on series and parallel circuits.
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II. Literature Review
2.1 Obfuscation
Obfuscation, according to Webster [13] means to “make obscure” or to “confuse”.Obfuscation in general means to make something harder to understand. In the
computer world, obfuscation means to alter software by concealing the structure and
intent of the code, while preserving the behavior [15]. Obfuscation can be viewed
as a semantic-preserving transformation of a computer program that transforms the
original program into a variant which complicates the understanding of the algorithm
and data structures. It also prevents extracting valuable information from the source
code of the program [16].
2.2 Black Box and White Box Analysis
The first type of analysis a reverse engineer could do is black box analysis.
This is often looked at as analyzing the behavior of a circuit. McDonald considers
software behavior as the black box functional characteristics of a circuit reflected by
all possible input and output combinations, or denotational semantics [12]. In the case
of black box analysis, the reverse engineer has no access to the internal workings of a
circuit and doesn’t know the physical input and output relationship. He must try all
possible combinations of inputs and measure each corresponding output to determine
the function of the circuit. Limiting the reverse engineer to black box analysis is the
best result a circuit obfuscator can achieve and this analysis is unavoidable for low
level control logic circuits that are truly random [8]. Forcing the reverse engineer
to try all combinations is effective even in relatively small circuits. For example,
the International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS) ’85 circuits listed in
Table 2.1 have inputs that number from 32 to 233. The smallest circuit has 232, or
4,294,967,296 possible input combinations. At 1 second to test each input combination
and record every output, all possibilities are covered in just over 136 years. If every
test takes only 1 millisecond, it will still take nearly 50 days to test all combinations
in this small circuit.
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Circuit Function Inputs Outputs Logic
Gates
Major
Func-
tional
Blocks
C-432 27-channel interrupt
controller
36 7 160 5
C-499 32-bit SEC circuit 41 32 202 2
C-880 8-bit ALU 60 26 383 7
C-1355 32-bit SEC circuit 41 32 546 2
C-1908 16-bit SEC/DED cir-
cuit
33 25 880 6
C-2670 12-bit ALU and con-
troller
233 140 1,193 7
C-3540 8-bit ALU 50 22 1,669 11
C-5315 9-bit ALU 178 123 2,307 10
C-6288 16x16 multiplier 32 32 2,406 240
C-7552 32-bit adder and com-
parator
207 108 3,512 8
Table 2.1: ISCAS ’85 Benchmark Circuits
The second type of analysis is white box analysis. This analyzes circuit recon-
struction, commonly referred to as the structural topology. In white box analysis, the
reverse engineer has access to the sequence of the inputs and outputs and the internal
gate structure of the circuit. To the reverse engineer, having white box access is a
huge improvement because white box analysis might identify commonly used compo-
nent structures, such as adders, multipliers, multiplexers, and accumulators. These
common components can be grouped together to form a high level functional unit
that is easier to understand. Figure 2.1 is a high level look at the 36 input, 160 gate
C-432 benchmark circuit. If this can be converted from a series of gates into a high
level module, time consuming process of black box analysis can be avoided.
2.3 Reverse Engineering
Reverse engineering, according Chikofsky and Cross [3], is
“...regularly applied to improve your own products, as well as analyze a
competitor’s products or those of an adversary in a military or national-
security situation.”
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Figure 2.1: C432 High Level Abstraction
They continue to say that reverse engineering is the process of analyzing a system
to identify the components and their relationships, and to create a representation
of the system in another form or at a higher level of abstraction. It is a process
of examination, not a process of change or replication. M.G Reckoff defines reverse
engineering as
“the process of developing a set of specifications for a complex hardware
system by an orderly examination of specimens of that system.”
The process is done by someone other than the developer of the system and without
the benefit of having access to any of the original system drawings for the purpose of
making a clone of the original hardware system [19].
Reverse engineers use many techniques to determine the functionality of a circuit
component. One white-box technique described in [8], visibly looks for functional
modules that are often used in industry to determine what the component or portion
of a component does. Identifying these modules greatly simplifies reverse engineering
by reducing the level of black box analysis. Even if the high-level designs are not
available, looking for typical designs used in circuit production, identifying commonly
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used sub-components of a design, or extracting the circuit from the net list makes
it easier to transform the circuit into a high-level functional model. By hiding the
visible signatures of these modules, a common reverse engineering technique can be
eliminated. For example, in Figure 2.2 every input to the 74238 Carry Look-Ahead
(CLA) adder (a module of the C-7552 benchmark circuit), except the carry-in bit
(C0), passes through a NAND and NOR gate. Every output, other than the carry-
out bit, comes from a XOR gate.
Figure 2.2: 74238 Carry Look-Ahead Adder
Identifying standard gate level designs such as these allow reverse engineers to
make certain assumptions about functionality. After a more detailed inspection of the
suspected adder, the reverse engineer will look for the carry look-ahead components.
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Once this technique is applied to other commonly used components (i.e., compara-
tors, multiplexers, decoders and counters), a high level model of the full design can
be created that is much easier to understand. Once the functionality is identified,
the circuit can be copied and used as needed. In the commercial sector, the reverse
engineer can improve on the design and produce a component that may work better
and cost less, since reversing often has a lower cost than the research and develop-
ment of the new component. In the military sector, the reverse engineer now better
understands the capability of the reversed system. This information can be used to
create similar systems that may limit or negate our military advantage or decrease
the time we have that advantage.
2.4 Embedded Systems
Embedded systems are commonly used today in nearly every device we use.
They are found in mobile phones, credit cards, automobiles, mp3 players, comput-
ers, wrist watches, appliances, televisions, etc. The market for embedded systems
has grown over the years as the demand for smaller devices with more functionality
increases. This demand increases the competition to produce smaller, faster, more
reliable devices. In the commercial sector, this competition creates friendly and un-
friendly opportunities for reverse engineers to examine the competition’s products for
new and improved designs, new production techniques, or any other proprietary in-
formation which may give them an advantage. In the military sector, understanding
an embedded system provides clues to weapon system functionality, cryptographic
implementations and weaknesses, and ways to bypass security measures, to name but
a few.
By the very fact these embedded systems are small, security problems are cre-
ated. Keeping the devices small and fast, may limit the types of cryptography that
can be used effectively. Many embedded devices can be easily reverse engineered if
proper protection is not applied [14]. For example, the Mifare Classic Radio Fre-
quency Identification (RFID) tokens were reverse engineered and its cipher broken.
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Using knowledge of how this cipher operates, capitalizing on a random number gen-
erator implementation flaw, and using inexpensive mechanical means to expose the
circuits on the chip to identify repeated gate structures the functionality of the circuit
was determined. One possible defense to reverse engineering was
“Tamper-proofing can be used to protect secret keys from attackers, but
provided little help against hardware reverse-engineering because the struc-
ture of the circuits will always be preserved. The implementation, how-
ever, could be obfuscated to increase the complexity of the circuit detec-
tion.”
Obfuscation will not make this approach infeasible but the degree obfuscation will
increase the effort and cost to reverse engineer a circuit is unknown. The measure
of circuit variant quality is determined by hiding the circuit components a reverse
engineer looks for when performing this type of hardware reverse engineering.
2.5 Side channel attacks
According to Drimer [6],
“Side channel attacks rely on device-external measurable manifestations of
internal processes to deduce secret data or mode of operation by exploiting
the implementation rather than the algorithmic construction.”
One side channel attack method is using electromagnetic analysis (EMA). This
attack relies on circuits producing magnetic fields due to the movement of electricity
during internal operations of the circuit. These fields can be measured outside of the
circuit using carefully tuned antennas, even without doing any physical modifications
to the circuit [7]. These results show that if properly set up, the EMA attacks can be
more efficient and produce better signal to noise ratios than equivalent power analysis
attacks. There are two kinds of emanations, direct and unintended [1] [2]. The direct
emanations are caused by current flowing through a circuit and the unintended are
caused by electrical and magnetic coupling between wires and components. The main
advantage of electromagnetic attacks versus power analysis attacks is electromagnetic
attacks can be localized to a particular portion of a chip where the activity of interest
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takes place. Also, the listening devices can be mounted on the device’s original packing
[6], removing the risk of damaging the circuit in a more invasive attack.
2.6 Invasive attacks
Invasive attacks physically probe the device to extract information. This pro-
cess removes the material that protects the metal interconnects of the circuit using
chemicals and/or mechanical means, or means as complicated as using a laser cutter
or focused ion beams [6]. When using this method it is necessary to have the expertise
and knowledge of how the circuits are manufactured and the proper location to insert
any probes. Any circuit obfuscation makes this process more difficult.
2.7 Algorithm Overview
A tool that aids in module or component hiding is Circuit Obfuscation via
Randomization of Graphs Iteratively(CORGI) [15]. CORGI allows a designer to easily
transform a circuit into a functionally equivalent, but visibly different circuit by using
different selection and replacement algorithms to remove and replace logic gates in
a circuit. In the case of component hiding, the original circuit C, is transformed
to C ′ by some obfuscation function O on C, where O(C) = C ′ and C and C ′ are
semantically equivalent; ∀x ∈ [0, 1]n : C(x) = C ′(x), where n is the input size of C.
CORGI takes in a directed graph based representation of a given circuit and is versatile
enough to perform several functions on it. The original circuit C and defines its
class CX−Y −S−Ω, where X is the input size, Y is the output size, S is the maximum
number of gates, and Ω is the basis (i.e., AND, NAND, NOR, XOR, OR, XNOR).
CORGI selects a subset of the circuit’s gates, based on the defined selection strategy
and makes an equivalent subset replacement based on the replacement parameter
(e.g., replacing two gates with three new functionally equivalent gates). The CORGI
discussion below assumes white box protection with experiments where algorithms
are sequenced semantic-preserving structural transformations based on random or
deterministic choices arranged in some random or deterministic manner. A circuit
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obfuscator is a program that selects semantically equivalent variants of the original
circuit as replacement circuits. One obfuscation measurement goal maximizes the
randomness between the intermediate gates of C and its variant C ′ [15]. The term
gates is used when discussing logic in combinational circuits and the term node is used
when discussing graphs. Since the nodes in a graph represent the gate level structure
of a circuit, these terms are used interchangeably.
2.7.1 Gate Selection.
2.7.1.1 Selection Strategies. There are several parameters that define
how the gates of a circuit or sub-circuit are selected for replacement. These parameters
may be chosen individually or chosen at random by selecting the RandomAlgorithm
selection strategy. For notational purposes let Φ represent the set of all gates in the
circuit, and gx represent a gate such that gx ∈ Φ. The selection options defined in [15]
are as follows:
• RandomSingleGate - Choose g1 ∈ Φ in a random, uniform manner.
• RandomTwoGates - Choose g1 ∈ Φ in a random, uniform manner. Choose
g2 ∈ Φ such that g1 6= g2 and where the replacement of the sub-circuit (g1, g2)
will not cause a cycle.
• RandomLevelTwoGates - Choose g1 ∈ Φ in a random, uniform manner. Choose
g2 ∈ Φ such that g1 6= g2 and where level(g2) = level(g1) or level(g2) ± 1 and
where the replacement of the sub-circuit (g1, g2) will not cause a cycle.
• LargestLevelTwoGates - Choose g1 ∈ Φ such that |level(gx)| = lmax represents
the maximum size of all levels within the circuit: lmax = ⊔{|level(gx)| | (gx) ∈
Φ}. Choose g2 ∈ Φ where g2 6= g1 and where level(g2) = level(g1) or level(g2) =
level(g1)+1 and where the replacement of the sub-circuit (g1, g2) will not cause
a cycle.
• OutputLevelTwoGates - Choose g1 ∈ Φ where g1 is a distinguished intermediate
gate (i.e., an output of the circuit). Choose g2 ∈ Φ where g1 6= g2 and where
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level(g2) = level(g1) + 1 or level(g2) = level(g1) and where the replacement
sub-circuit (g1, g2) will not cause a cycle.
• FixedLevelTwoGates - Choose g1 ∈ Φ where, for some user-provided level cri-
teria k, level(g1) = k. Choose g2 ∈ Φ where g2 6= g1 and where level(g2) =
level(g1) + 1 or level(g2) = level(g1) and where the replacement of the sub-
circuit (g1, g2) will not cause a cycle.
• RandomAlgorithm - Choose any selection strategy γ ∈ S in a random, uniform
manner. One algorithm may also weigh more heavily than others, and is done
so programatically.
2.7.2 Gate Replacement. CORGI models programs as combinational Boolean
circuits. Since combinational circuits do not contain feedback loops, a combinational
circuit over Ω is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) having nodes that either map to a
function in Ω, referred to as gates, having nodes in degree 0 referred to as inputs, and
having one or more intermediate nodes as an output. The basis sets AND, OR, NOT,
AND, NOT, OR, NOT, NAND and NOR are known to be complete, meaning any
given circuit can be recreated using only the gates given the previous sets.
Figure 2.3: Directed and Undirected Graphs
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Figure 2.3 [15] illustrates several directed and undirected graph examples. They
are:
(a) An undirected graph with no cycles
(b) A directed graph with no cycles
(c) A undirected graph with one cycle(1-2-3-4-1 and 1-4-3-2-1)
(d) A directed graph with one cycle (1→ 2→ 3→ 4→ 1)
(e) An undirected multi-graph with one cycle (4-6)
(f) A directed acyclic multi-graph with no cycles
2.7.2.1 Replacement rules. Other criteria that determine how a sub-
circuit is replaced is defined by whether or not to allow the following:
• SymmetricGates - Are symmetric gates allowed? For example, are gates with
inputs X1, X2 considered equivalent to gates with inputs X2, X1?
• AllowConstants - Are circuits granted immediate access to the constants True
and False? Gates that have these properties may exist in a circuit, but it may
change the properties of a set of circuits if these constants are immediately
available.
• RedundantGates - Are gates allowed that are identical to other gates based on
the inputs? Can there be two gates in a circuit where the truth table for each
gate, based on all circuit inputs, is the same?
• DuplicateInputs - Are inputs to a gate allowed to originate from the same
source?
• ExactCount - Does the set of replacement circuits contain all circuits with a
certain size bound, or only circuits of an exact size? For example, if the circuit
size is S= 4 and ExactCount = false, enumerating δX−Y −S−Ω creates a family
of circuits with gate sizes 1, 2, 3 and 4, where if ExactCount = true the family
of circuits will all have a size of 4.
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• SimpleOutputs - Which gates will be defined as outputs? It may be necessary
to index a circuit by an output signature and these must be restricted to specific
gates. If SimpleOutputs = true, the outputs are then pushed to the lowest level
of the graph. This option also prevents what is referred to as dangling gates;
gates being considered as outputs that are never actually used.
2.7.2.2 Avoiding a cycle. As defined above, the first gate in a two gate
replacement, g1, is chosen based on the user defined selection strategy. The second
gate, g2, is chosen in the same manner as long as it doesn’t create a cycle. An example
of a possible cycle is illustrated in Figure 2.4. The two gates selected for substitution,
Csub, cannot be replaced without creating a cycle. The new replacement sub-circuit
Crep has an output that provides an input to the NAND gate C, who’s output is also
an input to Crep. These two gates are rejected as a replacement option and another
attempt is made to find a replacement that doesn’t cause a cycle. Assuming Crep
is larger than two gates, if all possible replacements for the two gate substitution
cause a cycle, the algorithm either stops executing and no replacement is made, or
the algorithm replaces g1 with a three gate equivalent. The two gate replacement case
is guaranteed to work because even if no new gates are found to replace the two gates
selected, the two gate selection can always be replaced with itself.
Figure 2.4: Cycle in a Replacement Circuit
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 illustrate a two gate selection with a three gate replacement.
Gates 31 and 32 are selected for replacement using the RandomTwoGates algorithm.
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Figure 2.5: Two Gate Selection
These gates are replaced by the three gate combination formed by gates 41, 42 and
43. In Figure 2.5 there is no control flow from input 1 to the output of gate 23. After
the replacement, a new control flow is introduced. This new control flow introduction
is an important result useful for component hiding; it allows independent, unrelated
sub-circuits to merge into one circuit.
2.8 Selection and Replacement Example
The following example illustrates the selection and replacement algorithm. Start-
ing with the C-17 benchmark circuit in Figure 2.7, the corresponding BENCH file is
created. This BENCH file is the input to the selection and replacement algorithm.
In this example the RandomTwoGates algorithm is used with a two gate selection
and three gate replacement strategy. Table 2.2 lists the selection and replacements
performed for the first three iterations and Table 2.3 contains the original BENCH
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Figure 2.6: Three Gate Replacement with New Control Flow
Table 2.2: Results per Iteration for RandomTwoGate Algorithm
Iteration Selected Gates Replacement Gates
1 23, 19 23, 24, 25
2 16, 10 26, 27, 28
3 27, 11 29, 30, 31
file and the BENCH files for the first three iterations. Figure 2.8 is the graph of the
original BENCH file and the starting point of the algorithm. Figures 2.9-2.11 show
the gate level selection and replacement for the first three iterations of the algorithm.
In this example the inputs, NAND gates, and OR gates are represented by trapezoids,
hexagons, and ellipses, respectively.
In the first iteration of the algorithm gates 23 and 19 are chosen for replacement.
These two gates are replaced with the three gate equivalent 23, 24, and 25. Gate 24
is an identical match to gate 19. Gate 25 is a two input OR gate (buffer) and gate 23
remains the same with the output of 25 replacing the output of 19. In iteration two,
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Figure 2.7: C-17 Benchmark Circuit and BENCH File
Figure 2.8: Graph Representing C-17 Benchmark Circuit
Table 2.3: Experiment BENCH Files
Iteration 0 Iteration 1 RIteration 2 Iteration 3
INPUT(1) INPUT(1) INPUT(1) INPUT(1)
INPUT(2) INPUT(2) INPUT(2) INPUT(2)
INPUT(3) INPUT(3) INPUT(3) INPUT(3)
INPUT(6) INPUT(6) INPUT(6) INPUT(6)
INPUT(7) INPUT(7) INPUT(7) INPUT(7)
OUTPUT(22) OUTPUT(22) OUTPUT(22) OUTPUT(22)
OUTPUT(23) OUTPUT(23) OUTPUT(23) OUTPUT(23)
11 = NAND(3, 6) 11 = NAND(3, 6) 11 = NAND(3, 6) 29 = NAND(3, 6)
10 = NAND(1, 3) 24 = NAND(7, 11) 24 = NAND(7, 11) 30 = OR(29, 29)
16 = NAND(2, 11) 10 = NAND(1, 3) 26 = OR(1, 1) 24 = NAND(7, 30)
19 = NAND(7, 11) 16 = NAND(2, 11) 25 = OR(24, 24) 26 = OR(1, 1)
22 = NAND(10, 16) 25 = OR(24, 24) 27 = NAND(2, 11) 25 = OR(24, 24)
23 = NAND(16, 19) 22 = NAND(10, 16) 28 = NAND(3, 26) 28 = NAND(3, 26)
23 = NAND(16, 25) 22 = NAND(27, 28) 31 = NAND(2, 29)
23 = NAND(25, 27) 22 = NAND(28, 31)
23 = NAND(25, 31)
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(a) Selection (b) Replacement
Figure 2.9: Iteration 1 Selection and Replacement
(a) and (b)
(a) Selection (b) Replacement
Figure 2.10: Iteration 2 Selection and Replacement
(a) and (b)
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(a) Selection (b) Replacement
Figure 2.11: Iteration 3 Selection and Replacement
(a) and (b)
gates 10 and 16 are chosen for replacement and replaced with gates 26, 27, and 28.
Gates 27 and 28 provide the same functionality as 10 and 16. Gate 26 is another buffer
added to the circuit. The last iteration performs the same function of introducing a
new buffer to the circuit. Although this example doesn’t introduce new control flow
or introduce any new gates to the circuit that are not buffers, it does illustrate the
basic gate selection and replacement.
2.9 Gate Level Ancestry
This section provides an introduction to gate level ancestry. An ancestor is
defined by Webster [13] as a precursor of a more recent group. Thus, any new gate
introduced is of direct descent from an ancestor or group of ancestors, just as a child is
a direct descendant from it’s parents. This is used to generate ancestry data for each
gate in a circuit. Ancestry data is used to generate the colored graphs and calculate
ancestral entropy, which is defined in Chapter III.
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2.9.1 Ancestry File Structure. Care must be taken when creating the base-
line ancestry files for experiments. The file must match the same structure as the
BENCH file being used for the initial experiments. Anomalies in the colored graphs
can generally be traced back to an error in the initial ancestry file. The ancestry
file starts with an initial state for every identified sub-circuit or sub-component. For
example, for two circuits or sub-circuits each line of the sub-component will have an
assigned ancestry value of (1,0), (0,1) or (1,1). Table 2.4 provides an example of a
BENCH file and the corresponding ancestry file. This file should end with ‘ances-
try.txt’ for the software to perform properly. The descriptions following the # sign
are not necessary but are useful in identifying the function of each gate.
Table 2.4: BENCH and Ancestry File Example
BENCH File Ancestry file
INPUT(1) 1(1,0,0)
INPUT(2) 2(1,0,0)
INPUT(3) 3(1,0,0)
INPUT(6) 6(1,0,0)
INPUT(7) 7(1,0,0)
OUTPUT(32) 32
OUTPUT(33) 33
10 = NAND(1, 3) 10(1,0,0) #NAND(1, 3)
11 = NAND(3, 6) 11(1,0,0)#NAND(3, 6)
19 = NAND(11, 7) 19(1,0,0) #NAND(11, 7)
16 = NAND(2, 11) 16(1,0,0) #NAND(2, 11)
12 = NAND(10, 16) 12(1,0,0) #NAND(10, 16)
13 = NAND(16, 19) 13(1,0,0) #NAND(16, 19)
20 = NAND(12, 3) 20(0,1,0) #NAND(12, 3)
21= NAND(3, 6) 21(0,1,0) #NAND(3, 6)
29 = NAND(21, 7) 29(0,1,0) #NAND(21, 7)
26 = NAND(13, 21) 26(0,1,0) #NAND(13, 21)
22 = NAND(20, 26) 22(0,1,0) #NAND(20, 26)
23 = NAND(26, 29) 23(0,1,0) #NAND(26, 29)
30 = NAND(22, 3) 30(0,0,1) #NAND(22, 3)
31 = NAND(3, 6) 31(0,0,1) #NAND(3, 6)
39 = NAND(31, 7) 39(0,0,1) #NAND(31, 7)
36 = NAND(23, 31) 36(0,0,1) #NAND(23, 31)
32 = NAND(30, 36) 32(0,0,1) #NAND(30, 36)
33 = NAND(36, 39) 33(0,0,1) #NAND(36, 39)
#end of original gates
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New nodes created by the selection and replacement algorithm are stored in a
log file that contains the events of every iteration of the experiment. This log file
is the input when generating ancestry files for every iteration. Each iteration the
previous ancestry file is read, along with the log file, and the new ancestry values are
computed and written to a new ancestry file.
2.9.2 Computing Ancestry. The ancestry value of each node is computed
from the baseline ancestry file. This file is created by the user and sub-circuits are
defined as required. Figure 2.12 and the ancestry file in Table 2.4 has three sub-
circuits (defined as A, B, and C), each with its unique ancestry values (i.e., A=(1,0,0),
B=(0,1,0) and C=(0,0,1)). These baseline ancestry values are used to generate the
ancestry values of any nodes introduced into the circuit. For example, in Figure 2.13
nodes 30 and 39 from Figure 2.12 are replaced with nodes 40, 41 and 42. The ancestry
value for node 41 has not changed because it has the same inputs and performs the
same function as node 30 so the ancestry values are preserved.
Figure 2.12: Baseline Circuit with Ancestry
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Figure 2.13: 1st Iteration
The ancestry for each gate is computed by examining the ancestry values of the
parent nodes of the replaced gate. CORGI only uses two input gates, so there are
only two parent nodes, X and Y , for each new node. If n is the number of sub-circuits
in the baseline ancestry file, then X = {x1, x2, ..., xn} and Y = {y1, y2, ..., yn} are
the sets of ancestry values for the parent nodes and the new ancestry set for the new
node Z is Z = {z1, z2, ..., zn} and is computed as follows:
for i = 1 to n
if xi = 0 or yi = 0
then zi = xi + yi
if xi ≥ yi
then zi = xi + 1
else zi = yi + 1
The ancestry value for node 40 is (1,0,1), meaning that there is one ancestor
from circuit A, no ancestors from circuit B, and 1 ancestor from circuit C. The an-
cestry of node 41 is dependent on the ancestry of node 40, so the ancestry algorithm
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Figure 2.14: Ancestry Example Circuit, 15th Iteration
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calculates the independent nodes first, then the nodes with dependencies. Node 42
has a double input from the output of node 40, so the ancestry value is (2,0,2). Figure
2.14 illustrates the introduction of gates that have ancestors from circuits A, B, and
C. Nodes 73, 76, and 77 have all three ancestry values greater than zero. The parent
to node 73 are nodes 63 and In3 with respective ancestry values of (0,3,3) and (1,0,0).
These two values sum to (1,3,3).
2.10 Entropy
It is assumed that a circuit with nodes that have equal ancestry values from all
original sub-circuits provides better obfuscation than a circuit with nodes where some
sub-circuits are not represented. To evaluate this ‘goodness’, entropy measures the
level of uncertainty that a specific node or gate originates from a defined component.
A circuit with higher entropy is expected to be more difficult to reduce than a circuit
with lower entropy. In [17], Rajgopal uses spatial entropy to measure the energy in
a combinational circuit. Similarly, this research defines ancestral entropy, to measure
the effectiveness of circuit variant producing algorithm in terms of component hiding,
which is defined in Chapter III. Ancestral entropy (see Definition 5) is
H(P ) = −
∑
i∈N
pilog2(pi) (2.1)
where pi is the probability of the gate being from a defined component i. When
the probability of each of the ancestry values are equal, this is the maximum entropy
value, H(P )max. The baseline ancestry value, (i.e., when only one ancestry component
is greater than 0), is the minimum entropy value, H(P )min, which equates to zero.
For example, for the ancestry values (0,0,1) and (12,12,12),
H(P )min = −1log2(1) = 0
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and
H(P )max = −(−1/3 ∗ log2(1/3)− 1/3 ∗ log2(1/3)− 1/3 ∗ log2(1/3)) = 1.58493
respectively. The H(P )max a tuple has equal values because that gate has an equal
number of ancestors from each of the defined sub-circuits. Therefore, the gate is
equally likely to have originated from any of the three original sub-circuits. This
attribute provides a way to compare the transformation algorithms on like circuits.
Table 2.5 contains the maximum ancestral entropy values discussed in this research.
Table 2.5: Maximum Ancestral Entropy Values
1 ancestor 2 ancestors 3 ancestors 4 ancestors
H(P )max = 0 H(P )max = 1 H(P )max = 1.585 H(P )max = 2
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III. Methodology
3.1 Problem Definition
When obfuscating software or hardware no effective way of measuring how wellthe obfuscation will perform against an attack has been developed. The
level of difficulty facing the reverse engineer is a function of his experience, domain
knowledge, available tools, and the software or hardware implementation.
3.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis. The goals of this research are to define com-
ponent hiding, compare the circuit transformations (i.e., the output of the CORGI
selection algorithms), and to develop an attribute that reflects the obfuscating prop-
erties a circuit variant provides (i.e., define an attribute for the CORGI selection
algorithms to identify a circuit variant with the best component hiding properties).
We hypothesize the iterative selection and replacement algorithms provide mea-
surable component hiding properties, resulting in the circuit transformations not eas-
ily undone by a circuit reducer (or a reverse engineer). A polymorphic circuit engine
based on iterative selection and replacement (CORGI) alters circuits to hide circuit
or sub-circuit components. Component hiding, defined later, adds difficulty to the
reverse engineering effort by preventing a reverse engineer from grouping gates into a
higher level functional model, thus reducing the amount of black box analysis. CORGI
provides a graph of each iteration when creating a circuit variant. This graph shows
circuit changes, but doesn’t provide sufficient visual information on how the changes
are occurring. Creating an ancestry value for each gate in the circuit measures how
much each circuit changes during each iteration and it provides a history for each
node, as well as a colored graph as a visual representation. Using CORGI to select
and replace gates in a circuit and comparing this circuit variant to the original pro-
vides information about the quality of a circuit variant based on the different selection
algorithms used. Entropy measures the uncertainty of whether a gate belongs to an
original component.
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3.1.2 Approach. Baseline circuits and configurations are identified (i.e.,
series, parallel, shared inputs, etc.), as well as the parameters CORGI uses to create
the circuit variant. Experiments on series and parallel circuits using different CORGI
selection algorithms identifies the contribution of each algorithm to the creation of a
circuit variant. Ancestry information and changes to each baseline circuit are recorded
at every iteration providing a history of gate level transformations.
3.2 System boundaries
The System Under Test (SUT) is the Circuit Transformation System (CORGI)
shown in Figure 3.1. The specific components under test are the following selection
and replacement algorithms:
1. RandomTwoGates selection and replacement algorithm
2. RandomLevelTwoGates selection and replacement algorithm
3. LargestLevelTwoGates selection and replacement algorithm
4. OutputLevelTwoGates selection and replacement algorithm
5. FixedLevelTwoGates selection and replacement algorithm
6. RandomAlgorithm selection and replacement algorithm
These algorithms are applied to each of the series and parallel circuits described
in this section. A comparison of the resulting circuit variant determines the obfusca-
tion effectiveness of the selection algorithm for that circuit.
3.3 System Services
The service provided by the system is the selection and replacement of logic
gates based on the system parameters. Changes to the circuit are recorded in a graph
file, a bench file, a log file, and an ancestry file. The first possible system output
are the files representing a functionally equivalent circuit variant. A second possible
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Figure 3.1: Circuit Transformation System (CORGI)
output are files representing a circuit variant that is not functionally equivalent. The
last possibility is that nothing occurs, signifying a failure of the system.
3.4 Workload
The workload of this system is three tiered. The first workload is a circuit bench
file that specifies the circuit or sub-circuits and their configuration. This may be a
stand alone circuit or sub-circuits connected in series or parallel with independent or
shared inputs. CORGI accepts bench files as input for the gate selection algorithms
and provides a bench file and a graph file as an output for each iteration, along with
a log file that stores the details of each iteration. This log file, along with a user
provided ancestry file, is the second workload and generates ancestry information for
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each iteration of the selection and replacement algorithm. The third workload is the
previously generated graph and ancestry files for each iteration. These files are used
to produced the final colored graph that visually displays the ancestry of each gate
in the circuit and file that contains the ancestral entropy calculation for each node,
the average ancestral entropy at each level and at the output of the circuit. Figure
3.1 illustrates how the workload and output are related.
3.5 System Parameters
The system parameters for this research are as follows:
1. Selection and Replacement Algorithm
• RandomTwoGates
• RandomLevelTwoGates
• LargestLevelTwoGates
• OutputLevelTwoGates
• FixedLevelTwoGates
• RandomAlgorithm
2. Circuit Type
• C-17 Benchmark Circuit
3. Circuit Configurations
• Series Configuration
• Parallel Configurations
4. Number of gates replaced
• Replace Two Gates With 3 gates
• Replace Two Gates With 4 gates
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The C-17 benchmark circuit, shown in Figure 2.7 is used because it is a small
circuit composed of NAND gates and is part of the ISCAS ’85 suite of benchmark
circuits. This circuit is representative of the many small sub-circuits found in larger
circuits, such as adders, multiplexors, and decoders. This circuit is examined in four
different series and parallel configurations. Some of the configurations use independent
inputs to each circuit, while others share some, or all, of the inputs. Figures 3.2 and
3.3 illustrate the four C-17 circuit configurations.
The six different selection and replacement algorithms are tested to determine if
any one algorithm outperforms another, in terms of obfuscation properties. Multiple
circuit types are chosen to see if different algorithms perform better on series or
parallel circuits with different configurations. Using the replacement parameters of
three and four gates test whether one type of replacement is better than another.
Smart selection, in the case of the RandomTwoGates replacement algorithm, means
at least one original node is used in every selection and replacement iteration until
all original nodes have been replaced at least once prior to any two new nodes being
selected for replacement. Allowing duplicate inputs and redundant gates provides
easier gate replacement and improves the chances independent circuits will have gates
selected for replacement, allowing earlier merging of circuits.
3.6 Performance Metrics
Three different performance metrics are used to measure obfuscation. The first
is the number of circuits or sub-circuits removed from the original circuit based on
the calculated ancestry information. The colored graph shows the gate ancestry and
new colors represent gates that have an ancestor from different circuits (defined in
the original ancestry file). The more original sub-circuits, or components of a circuit
removed and new circuits introduced, the better the obfuscation. The second mea-
surement is the percentage of original gates remaining in a circuit. A lower percentage
of original gates remaining in the final circuit variant correlates with a better level of
obfuscation. The final measurement calculates the ancestral entropy of every node,
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(a) 5 Inputs (b) 11 Inputs
Figure 3.2: C17 Series Circuits (a) and (b)
each level, and outputs of the circuit. Measuring the uncertainty of the ancestry pro-
vides an attribute for comparing the effectiveness of obfuscation each of the circuit
variants provide.
3.7 Factors
Table 3.1 contains the factors and levels for this research effort. The six se-
lection and replacement algorithms are the experiment factors. Each algorithm uses
five different circuits and performs a two gate selection with a three and four gate
replacement. This results in 60 experiments, which are performed three times each.
3.8 Evaluation Technique
CORGI is used to simulate a random walk from the original circuit to the final
circuit variant. CORGI uses SmartSelectionAlgorithm.java program for each iteration
of the experiment. This code allows the user to specify the type of selection and re-
placement algorithm, the number of iterations to perform, the number of experiments
to repeat, whether to allow duplicate input gates and redundant gates, the number
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(a) Shared Inputs (b) Independent Inputs
Figure 3.3: C-17 Parallel Circuits (a) and (b)
Table 3.1: Factors and Levels
Factor Level
Algorithm Circuit Configuration Inputs Gates
Type Replaced
RandomTwoGates C-17 Series 5 3
RandomLevelTwoGates 4
OutputLevelTwoGates 5 ‘Split’ 3
FixedLevelTwoGates 4
LargestLevelTwoGates 11 3
RandomAlgorithm 4
Parallel Shared 3
4
Independent 3
4
of gates to select, the number of replacements and many other parameters. A log
file and graph files are produced that are used later. The flow chart in Figure 3.4
shows which files are needed to create subsequent files. The selection and replacement
algorithm uses the baseline BENCH file to generate a BENCH file and graphml file
for every iteration of the experiment. A log file that records the operations performs
during every iteration. The baseline ancestry file is created from the baseline BENCH
file and, along with the log file, creates the ancestry files for every iteration. To color
the graphs the graphml files and the ancestry files generate new graphml files that
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provide color, shape, number, and ancestry information for each node in the circuit
at every iteration. Entropy is computed using the BENCH files and the ancestry files.
Ancestral entropy is calculated for each node, at the output of the circuit, and at
every level of the circuit.
Figure 3.4: File Creation Flow Chart
The ColorGraph.java program uses the ancestry files, along with the original
graph files, to create a colored graph for every iteration that visually represents how
gates are related to one another as well as a file that identifies when new sub-circuits
are introduced or removed, based on their ancestry. These graphs identify any sub-
circuits removed, any trends for new gates introduced and the percentage of gates no
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longer associated with a single sub-circuit. The GetEntropy.java program also uses
the ancestry files to compute the ancestral entropy of each gate in the circuit, the
average ancestral entropy at each circuit level and at the outputs.
3.9 Experimental Design
The replacement rules discussed in Section 2.7.2.1 for three gate replacement
experiments are set to false except DuplicateInputs and RedundantGates. This set-
ting allows for the introduction of new circuit control flow when executing a three gate
replacement. However, many new gates introduced act as buffers (e.g., two input OR
and AND gates). The introduction of the new control flow will allow many of these
buffers to be replaced in future circuit variants. These two settings are set to false in
the four gate replacement experiments because new control flows are still introduced.
Initial experiments indicate there is no benefit to performing a two gate selection
with a two gate replacement on independent parallel circuits or series circuits as there
is no increase in entropy. When duplicate inputs and redundant gates were disallowed
independent circuits did not merge. Every algorithm, except RandomTwoGates, did
not change the structure of the circuits or introduce any new gates. Figure 3.5 contains
the results for a two gate replacement strategy on a parallel circuit for all of the selec-
tion and replacement algorithms except RandomTwoGatse. The RandomTwoGates
experiments did introduce new matching gates. But, since no change resulted to the
physical layout of the circuits it provided no component hiding characteristics. Figure
3.6 displays the same results for a series circuit. Although these gates were replaced
several times over in both figures, the circuit structure remains identical.
3.10 Adding Color and Shape to each Gate
To visualize the circuit transformations, the graphs generated by the chosen
algorithm incorporate colors for circuit or sub-circuit identification and shapes for
gate operation. These colors and shapes can be easily changed in the source code.
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Figure 3.5: C-17 Parallel Circuit Maintaining Structure
Figure 3.6: C-17 Series Circuit Maintaining Structure
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Figure 3.7: Basic Graph of a Circuit
The gate shapes are defined in Table 3.2 and different colors identify original circuits
and sub-circuits and the addition of new circuits or sub-circuits. Figure 3.7 illustrates
the the basic graph created by the algorithm. This graph has no distinguishing colors,
shapes, or labels for each node.
The binary value of the number of defined sub-circuits in the ancestry file pro-
vides unique colors to the graph. A three digit ancestry allows up to 7 colors (8 if
you include (0,0,0)). When determining the color of a gate the ancestry values are
taken from the parents of the new gate, summed, and converted converted to color
values. If the ancestry value component is greater than or equal to one, the new
color component is one. Otherwise, the color component is a zero. For example, if
the parent ancestry values were (4,0,2) and (1,0,2) resulting ancestry value sums to
(5,0,3) resulting in a color value of (1,0,1). This provides the same color for all nodes
with the same ancestor relationships.
Choosing the initial ancestry values limits the color results display ancestry.
First, assume a three component circuit with initial ancestry values of (0,0,1), (0,1,0),
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Table 3.2: Gate Operation and Matching Shape
Gate Operation Node Shape
AND Rectangle
NAND Hexagon
OR Ellipse
NOR Octagon
XOR Triangle
XNOR Diamond
Table 3.3: Coloring Schemes
Ancestry 1 Ancestry 2 Sum
First Level
001 010 011
001 100 101
010 100 110
Second Level
001 011 011
001 101 101
001 110 111
010 011 011
010 101 111
010 111 111
100 011 111
100 101 101
100 111 111
Third Level
011 101 111
011 110 111
110 101 111
and (1,1,0). With all three combinations of addition the possible results are (0,1,1),
(1,1,1), and (1,1,0). The uniqueness of each gate is not properly represented by a
color if the goal is to identify every level of ancestry. When (0,1,0) and (1,1,0) are
summed, the result for determining color is (1,1,0), which is the assigned color value
for an original sub-circuit. Choosing the initial values of (0,0,1), (0,1,0), and (1,0,0)
will provide correct coloring for the first level, but fails for much of the second level.
Table 3.3 and Figure 3.8 illustrate examples of this. The first level is the possible
combinations of addition for the three original ancestry values. The second level is
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the possible combinations of one of the original values summed with the results from
the first level. The third level shows the addition combinations of the results from
the first level. By the third level all of the resulting sums are the same. Color values
containing all ones are the nodes with ancestors from every pre-defined component.
Different schemes may allow more children nodes to be colored differently than both
parent nodes before running out of options. With a three sub-circuit ancestry there
can be only 7 colors in the graph (i.e., binary 000 to 111). It is not recommended
to use (0,0,0) since this does nothing under addition and will not result in a color
change for newly introduced nodes. It is possible to use a four or five digit ancestry
scheme while only having 2 or 3 identified sub-circuits. This provides up to 32 colors
to identify sub-circuits. The software currently allows the use of 15 colors, but can
be easily modified. This provides more options but the same problems in Table 3.3
apply.
Figure 3.8: Matching Results for 3 Levels
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3.11 Component Hiding
To properly describe component hiding the following definitions are provided:
Definition 1. Circuit: A directed, acyclic graph D(V,E) of inputs, logic gates
and outputs where 1) V is the set of nodes of the circuit where each node is ei-
ther an input with an assigned value or a gate with a corresponding Boolean function
f : {0, 1}x{0, 1} → {0, 1}, 2) E is the set of wires that connect nodes, 3) the gate set
G of a circuit is the set of all gate nodes within V , 4) inputs are nodes in the graph
with no fan-in and 5) outputs are distinguished nodes.
Definition 2. Component: Given a gate set G and an input set I of a circuit P
and an integer k > 1, where k is the number of components, a set C of components
{c1,...,ck} partitions G and I into k disjoint sets of inputs and/or gates.
Definition 3. Component Hiding: Given 1) an original circuit P with a gate
set Gand and input set I and 2) a set C which divides G and I into k disjoint
components {c1, c2, ...., ck}, any functionally equivalent variant P
′ of P with gate set
G′ accomplishes component hiding if and only if, for all gates g ∈ G′, maximal un-
certainty exists regarding the relationship of any gate g to any original component
{c1, c2, ...., ck}.
Definition 4. Ancestry: Given m number of gates in a circuit, k number of defined
components in a circuit, and a tuple T = {t1, t2, ..., tk−1, tk} assigned to each gate gm
in a circuit, where t describes the composition of gm in terms of the n
th component.
Definition 5. Ancestral Entropy: Let P = (pi, ..., pn) be a probability distribution
on the set of N = (1, ..., n) components in a circuit. The entropy of P is the function
H(P ) = −
∑
i∈N
pilog2(pi), where N is the number of components in a circuit and
pi is the probability of a gate being from a defined component i. Maximum ancestral
entropy, H(P )max, is achieved when pi = pi+1 = ... = pn−1 = pn. H(P )min is achieved
when pi = 1.
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There are four cases to consider when discussing component hiding. They are
listed below using Figure 3.9 as an example.
• Case 1. Input from the circuit boundary and output to a component: Compo-
nent A receives the inputs from the circuit boundary and its output is connected
to the internal component B.
• Case 2. Input from a component and output to a component: Internal compo-
nent B receives the inputs from component A and its output is connected to
component C.
• Case 3. Input from a component and output to the circuit boundary: Compo-
nent C receives its inputs from internal component B and provides output to
the circuit boundary.
• Case 4. Input from the circuit boundary and output to the circuit boundary:
ComponentD receives the inputs from the circuit boundary and provides output
to the circuit boundary.
To measure the level of component hiding, GetAncestry.java uses the log file and
an ancestry file that identifies sub-circuits or sub-components of the initial circuit to
generate ancestry files for every iteration in the experiment. This ancestry information
is used to measure the uncertainty a node in the circuit belongs to any previously
identified component.
3.12 Methodology Summary
The main goals of this research are to define component hiding, compare the
CORGI selection and replacement algorithms, identify obfuscating properties, and
define an attribute that reflects these properties. A baseline circuit is used (i.e.,
C-17 sub-circuits in series and parallel configurations) as input to the six selection
algorithms and an entropy-based calculation is used to define an attribute that reflects
the component hiding properties of each algorithm.
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Figure 3.9: Component Hiding Cases
The factors studied are six CORGI selection and replacement algorithms; Ran-
domTwoGates, RandomLevelTwoGates, RandomAlgorithm, LargestLevelTwoGates,
FixedLevelTwoGates, and OutputLevelTwoGates. The input to the algorithms are
series and parallel circuits in BENCH format and the output is ancestry files, BENCH
files, entropy files, and colored graph files. These resulting files are evaluated and com-
pared to determine which algorithm creates circuit variants with better component
hiding properties for a given workload.
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IV. Results
Component hiding is an important operation that can complicate reverse engi-neering efforts. If sub-circuits are hidden from a reverse engineer he cannot
group logic gates into a higher level model, forcing him to do a black box analysis
of the circuit. The following experiments show how the different CORGI selection
and replacement algorithms perform. Ancestral node entropy, circuit level entropy
and output level entropy values are compared to determine which algorithms provide
better component hiding properties using different types of circuits. This chapter
is divided into the following sections: Section 4.1 discusses three gate replacement
series circuits, Section 4.2 discusses three gate replacement parallel circuits, Section
4.3 describes the results of reducing three and four gate replacement circuits, Section
4.4 and 4.5 discuss the results of the four gate replacement series and parallel circuits
respectively and Section 4.6 discusses validation.
4.1 Three Gate Replacement C-17 Series Circuits
Two series circuit configurations are used to test each of the six algorithms. The
results are compared and an algorithm is chosen that creates the best circuit variants
with obfuscating properties. The operation of each algorithm is explained in Section
2.7.1.1, but is summarized here as well. The two high level series designs used in this
research are illustrated again in Figure 4.1.
The five input series circuit shown in Figure 4.1(a) are a series of three C-17
circuits with shared inputs. This circuit is used in two different experiments for each
algorithm. CORGI selection algorithms often allow a sub-circuit(s) to be completely
replaced by the new gates introduced to the circuit. The removal of a circuit affects
the entropy calculation, and is explained below. This first C-17 sub-circuit in each
case has five inputs and two outputs. Two outputs and three of the initial inputs serve
as inputs to the second sub-circuit. The same holds true for the final C-17 sub-circuit.
The only difference in the two experiments is how the ancestry file is created. Shown
in Table 4.1, Ancestry File A connects all of the inputs to the first C-17 sub-circuit.
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(a) Shared Inputs (b) Individual
Inputs
Figure 4.1: High Level C-17 Series Circuits
(a) and (b)
The Ancestry File B connects two inputs to the first C-17 sub-circuit, two inputs to
the second C-17 sub-circuit, and one input to the last C-17 sub-circuit. The only
change required in the ancestry file is the assignment of ancestry to the input values.
This circuit is referred to as the five ‘split’ input circuit. These input configurations
are illustrated in Figure 4.2.
The experiments in Sections 4.1.1-4.1.6 select two gates for replacement and
performs a three gate equivalent replacement on the series circuits. Sections 4.2.1-
4.2.6 contains the parallel circuit experiments. The results of these experiments are
summarized in Section 4.1.7 and 4.2.7, respectively.
4.1.1 FixedLevelTwoGates Experiment.
4.1.1.1 Five Inputs Circuit Experiment. The fixed level algorithm
selects the first gate for replacement from a pre-defined level k. The second gate
is either chosen from level k or level k + 1. In this experiment, k is set to level
one resulting in all replacements being made at level one or level two. Level zero
is the output level. These replacements cause gates to be added to the kth level of
the graph [15]. As illustrated in Figure A.1, the graph becomes tall and narrow,
while preserving the upper and lower portions of the graph (i.e., the levels above
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Table 4.1: C-17 Series Experiments Ancestry Files
Ancestry File A Ancestry File B
#INPUTS #INPUTS
1(1,0,0) 1(1,0,0)
2(1,0,0) 2(1,0,0)
3(1,0,0) 3(0,1,0)
6(1,0,0) 6(0,1,0)
7(1,0,0) 7(0,0,1)
#OUTPUTS #OUTPUTS
32 32
33 33
10(1,0,0) #NAND(1, 3) 10(1,0,0) #NAND(1, 3)
11(1,0,0) #NAND(3, 6) 11(1,0,0) #NAND(3, 6)
19(1,0,0) #NAND(11, 7) 19(1,0,0) #NAND(11, 7)
16(1,0,0) #NAND(2, 11) 16(1,0,0) #NAND(2, 11)
12(1,0,0) #NAND(10, 16) 12(1,0,0) #NAND(10, 16)
13(1,0,0) #NAND(16, 19) 13(1,0,0) #NAND(16, 19)
20(0,1,0) #NAND(12, 3) 20(0,1,0) #NAND(12, 3)
21(0,1,0) #NAND(3, 6) 21(0,1,0) #NAND(3, 6)
29(0,1,0) #NAND(21, 7) 29(0,1,0) #NAND(21, 7)
26(0,1,0) #NAND(13, 21) 26(0,1,0) #NAND(13, 21)
22(0,1,0) #NAND(20, 26) 22(0,1,0) #NAND(20, 26)
23(0,1,0) #NAND(26, 29) 23(0,1,0) #NAND(26, 29)
30(0,0,1) #NAND(22, 3) 30(0,0,1) #NAND(22, 3)
31(0,0,1) #NAND(3, 6) 31(0,0,1) #NAND(3, 6)
39(0,0,1) #NAND(31, 7) 39(0,0,1) #NAND(31, 7)
36(0,0,1) #NAND(23, 31) 36(0,0,1) #NAND(23, 31)
32(0,0,1) #NAND(30, 36) 32(0,0,1) #NAND(30, 36)
33(0,0,1) #NAND(36, 39) 33(0,0,1) #NAND(36, 39)
#end of original gates #end of original gates
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(a) 5 Input (b) 5 ‘Split’ Input
Figure 4.2: Fixed Level C-17, 5 Input Circuits
(a) and (b)
and below the fixed level and one level higher). Notice the circuit outputs and the
upper portion of the graphs do not change. If the fixed level is selected to be level
zero, this algorithm performs the same function as the output level algorithm. For all
fixed level experiments, the original gates are not replaced when creating the circuit
variants. This can be seen in Figure A.1 as early as iteration 50. The upper portion
of the graph maintains its structure, preserving two of the three original circuits.
Because the fixed level is set to one for this experiment, outputs are never selected
for replacement, guaranteeing they remain part of the original circuit.
Illustrated in Figure A.2(a), the average circuit level ancestral entropy reaches
H(P )max in levels 1 to 309. The entropy values above level 309 represent most of
the original circuit and therefore, have lower entropy values. Because the gates to be
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replaced are selected in levels one and two, these levels of the graph quickly reach,
or nearly reach H(P )max causing most of the nodes in the 1000
th iteration to have
high entropy values. The average output level ancestral entropy in Figure A.2(b)
maintains a zero value because the outputs are never replaced. Of the 1023 nodes 973
have ancestors from all three sub-circuits, 966 of these have an ancestral entropy value
of 1.569 or higher which is 99% of H(P )max. However, much of the original circuit has
not been replaced at all. The orginal circuit has 18 nodes (all with H(P )min value)
while the 1000th iteration has 15 nodes that have a H(P )min value.
4.1.1.2 Five ‘Split’ Inputs Circuit Experiment. This circuit configura-
tion is identical to the five input circuit, except the ancestry file connects the inputs
to each of the sub-circuits. The graphs in Figure A.3 are structurally the same as
the five input graphs. However, the extrusion of gates has a H(P )max = 1, not 1.585
because of the way the ancestry file connects the inputs to each sub-circuit. The
upper rightmost sub-circuit remains unchanged resulting in the new nodes added to
the graph only having two non-zero ancestry values. In other words, each new node
only has ancestors from two of the three original circuits.
Examining Figure A.4, the average circuit level ancestral entropy is .997 or
greater from level one to level 324. This highlights the extrusion of gates and pro-
duces gates with ancestors from two of the original three sub-circuits. The average
output ancestral entropy is still zero because the output nodes are still part of an
original sub-circuit. Of the nodes in the circuit, 97.36% have ancestors from two
of the three subcircuits, while no nodes have ancestors from all three sub-circuits.
The remaining nodes are direct descendents of an original sub-circuit, while 14 of the
original 18 gates remain in the circuit.
4.1.1.3 Eleven Inputs Experiment. In this circuit configuration the
sub-circuit share no inputs but to keep them in series the output of the first circuit
feeds the inputs for the second, and the output of the second circuit feeds the input
of the third circuit. This configuration is shown in Figure A.5(a) clearly isolates each
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of the sub-circuits. The average circuit level entropy has a maximum value equal to
one because the the uppermost left circuit doesn’t become part of any circuit variant,
resulting in all new gates having a maximum of two non-zero ancestry values. Again,
the output nodes are never modified so the average output ancestral entropy is equal
to zero. Also, 96% of the nodes in the circuit have ancestors from two of the original
sub-circuits, while no nodes have ancestors from all three sub-circuits. At the 1000th
iteration, 15 of the 18 gates still remain in the circuit. These results are similar to
the five ‘split’ input experiment as Figure A.6 displays.
4.1.2 OutputLevelTwoGates. The output level algorithm selects the first
gate for replacement from the output level (i.e., level zero) and the second from
either level zero or level one and makes an equivalent three gate replacement. This
algorithm performs very similar to the fixed level algorithm when the fixed level equals
one, except in this case the output gates are replaced.
4.1.2.1 Five Inputs Circuit Experiments. All new gates introduced to
the circuit are descendants of the bottom most circuit, causing the graphs in Figure
A.7 to become very tall and narrow. The results shown Figure A.8 are nearly identical
to the fixed level experiments, except for the average output ancestral entropy. Here
H(P )max is 1 because all gates introduced have ancestors from the bottommost and
topmost circuits. There are 987 out of 1023 nodes with ancestors from two sub-
circuits, and no nodes with ancestors from all three. As Figure A.7(b) shows, the
upper rightmost circuit contributes ancestry information from only one of the input
nodes. Ancestral entropy values of .85 or higher occur in 986 nodes which is 53.8%
of H(P )max. Again, much of the original circuit has not been replaced. The orginal
circuit has 18 nodes (all with H(P )min value) while the 1000
th iteration has 15 nodes
that have a H(P )min value.
4.1.2.2 Five ‘Split’ Inputs Circuit Experiments. In this configuration,
all new gates introduced are descendants of the bottommost circuit. Figure A.9
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illustrates the introduction of new nodes to the bottom two levels of the circuits. A
total of 15 of 18 original gates remain in the circuit. All new nodes introduced have
an ancestral entropy of H(P )min. The average ancestral entropy for every level, node
and output in the circuit is also H(P )min because all new nodes are descendants from
only one original sub-circuit. The two rightmost sub-circuits in iteration zero are
preserved. Figure A.10 illustrates these results.
4.1.2.3 Eleven Inputs Experiment. This experiments results are the
same as the five ‘split’ input experiment. Levels zero and one both belong to the
bottommost circuit, resulting in new nodes having only one circuit ancestor. Again,
15 of the 18 original nodes remain in the circuit. The two leftmost circuits from
iteration zero are preserved. These results are illustrated in Figures A.11 and A.12.
4.1.3 LargestLevelTwoGates. The largest level algorithm chooses the first
gate from the hierarchical level with the highest number of gates, and the second gate
from the same level or the level above. This selection results in shorter and wider
circuits.
4.1.3.1 Five Inputs Circuit Experiments. In this experiment, most of
the gates are introduced in the middle of the circuit. Figure A.13 shows an increase
in width of the graph, even in the early iterations. This circuit has 71 levels, with an
average ancestral circuit level entropy of .95. There are 39 levels with the ancestral
entropy of 1 or greater. As Figure A.14 shows, the outputs are not replaced so the
they maintain the value of H(P )min. This circuit is much more balanced than the
previous circuits. There are 736 out of 1017 nodes with all three sub-circuit ancestors
and 13 of 18 original gates remaining in the circuit. There are 466 nodes that are
at least 99% of H(P )max while 731 nodes are at least 90% of H(P )max. This is
expected because in early iterations the largest levels contains nodes from all of the
defined sub-circuits, making it more likely for new nodes to have ancestors from all
sub-circuits.
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4.1.3.2 Five ‘Split’ Inputs Circuit Experiments. In this circuit the
output ancestral entropy maintains the original value because outputs are never re-
placed. The maximum entropy value for experiment is 1 because the right uppermost
circuit in Figure A.15(a) is preserved. Two ancestors are in 776 of 1017 nodes, while
no nodes have ancestor from all three original sub-circuits. The circuit contains 13 of
18 original nodes.
4.1.3.3 Eleven Inputs Experiment. This circuit has 72 levels with an
average circuit level ancestral entropy of .44. Ten of the levels have entropy values of
at least .85, and 17 are at least .8, 679 of 1022 nodes have ancestral entropy values
between .9 and 1, inclusive, 673 nodes have ancestral entropy between .95 and 1, while
446 nodes are greater or equal to .99. One ancestor from an original sub-circuit is
in 323 nodes, 699 have two ancestors, no gates have ancestors from all three original
sub-circuits, and 15 of 18 original circuits remain. Figures A.17 and A.18 illustrate
this.
4.1.4 RandomLevelTwoGates. The random level algorithm selects the first
gate from the circuit in a random, uniform manner. The second gate is selected
either from same level, the level above, or the level below the first selected gate.
Although this algorithm is more random than the aforementioned algorithms and is
likely to produce better component hiding properties, it limits the number of possible
replacement sub-circuits because both gates selected for replacement are from adjacent
or equivalent levels.
4.1.4.1 Five Inputs Circuit Experiments. The resulting circuit has 129
levels; 70 are above the H(P )min value of zero with respective ancestral averages of
.39 and .73. At the 500th iteration the average output ancestral entropy is 1.164. The
circuit contains only 2 of 23 original gates. There are a total of 511 nodes in the
circuit and 340 have one circuit ancestor, 108 have two ancestors, and 63 have three
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ancestors. Only seven nodes are 99% of H(P )max, and 51 nodes are 90% of H(P )max
(1.585). Figures A.19 and A.20 illustrate this.
4.1.4.2 Five ‘Split’ Inputs Circuit Experiments. This configuration
introduces a sub-graph at 6th iteration and removes this sub-graph from the graph
at the 79th iteration. This is not an original circuit being removed. There are the
same 129 levels, since this is the same circuit as the five input experiment, with 113
above the H(P )min value of zero. The total average ancestral entropy average is .64
and the average for nodes with values above zero is .73, the same as in the five input
circuit. At the 500th iteration the average output ancestral entropy is .996. There
are a total of 511 nodes in the circuit and 197 have one original circuit ancestor, 257
have two ancestors, and 57 have ancestors from three original sub-circuits. Only two
of the original 18 gates remain in the circuit as Figures A.21 and A.22 show.
4.1.4.3 Eleven Inputs Experiment. There are 207 levels with 64 levels
at H(P )min and 92 levels greater than zero or equal to one in this circuit. 52 nodes
have entropy values greater than one. The average ancestral entropy for each level in
the circuit is .66. The average for the nodes greater than zero is .95, meaning that on
average every node has ancestors from two out of three circuits. At the 500th iteration
the average output ancestral entropy is 1.56 which is 98.4% H(P )max. At the 1000
th
iteration it is 1.468, which is 92.6% of H(P )max. All original gates in the circuit have
been replaced at least once. Figures A.23 and A.24 illustrates this.
4.1.5 RandomTwoGates. The random two gate selection algorithm chooses
the first gate in a random, uniform manner. The second gate is chosen in the same
way. This algorithm is truly the most random and is expected to produce the best
component hiding properties for each of the circuit variants.
4.1.5.1 Five Inputs Circuit Experiments. This circuit, because of how
the ancestry file is built with the all inputs connected to one sub-circuit, has two
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of the original circuits replaced with new gates at iteration 66 and 72. There are
449 levels with an average ancestral entropy of .169. There are only 91 levels with
ancestral entropy values greater than zero because the upper rightmost circuit in
Figure A.25(a) dominates the graph as both of the other original circuits get removed
from the graph in early iterations. Figure A.25(e) shows only one remaining node
from the original bottommost circuit in Figure A.25(a). At the 1000th iteration the
average ancestral entropy at the outputs is 1.516, 882 gates have only one ancestor
from an original circuit, 63 have two ancestors, and 74 have three. All original gates
are replaced at least once in this circuit.
4.1.5.2 Five ‘Split’ Inputs Circuit Experiments. As in the five input
circuit, there are 449 levels with an average ancestral entropy per level of 1.126. There
are 417 levels that have a greater than zero entropy value. Of these, the average is
1.215. There are 285 levels that have an entropy value greater than one and their
average is 1.446. At the 1000th iteration the output ancestral entropy average is 1.559.
At the 710th iteration this average is 1.539. There are 177 gates with ancestors from
only one of the original circuits, 244 with ancestors from two and 598 gates with
ancestors from three. There are 150 gates with an ancestral entropy value of 99% of
H(P )max and there are 569 gates with an ancestral entropy value of 90% H(P )max.
All original gates have been replaced at least once. Figures A.27 and A.28 illustrate
this.
4.1.5.3 Eleven Inputs Experiment. In this circuit there are 401 levels
with an average ancestral entropy per level of .858, 345 of the levels are greater than
zero, while 152 levels are at least one. The average output ancestral entropy at the
1000th iteration is 1.516 and first reaches this value at the 561st iteration. There are
257 gates with ancestors from only one original circuit, 463 with ancestors from two
circuits, and 304 with ancestors from three circuits. There are 15, 191, and 270 nodes
with ancestral entropy values of 99%, 95%, and 90% of H(P )max respectively. All
original gates have been replaced at least once as Figures A.29 and A.30 show.
54
4.1.6 RandomAlgorithm. The random algorithm chooses one of the pre-
viously described algorithms at random and performs its function. The algorithms
can be weighted programmatically but are equally weighted herein. This algorithm
is not expected perform as well as the random two gate selection because all of the
algorithms, except for random two gate, are deterministic in nature. Furthermore,
because the fixed level in the FixedLevelTwoGates algorithm is set to one, it behaves
similarly to the OutputLevelTwoGates algorithm.
4.1.6.1 Five Inputs Circuit Experiments. In this circuit two of the
three original circuits are removed at iteration 113 and 176. There are 355 levels in
this circuit. The average ancestral entropy for all levels is 1.136. 102 of the levels are
H(P )max, while 227 are at least equal to one (two ancestors). The output ancestral
entropy is 1.58 (nearly H(P )max) and reaches this value at the 80
th iteration. There
are 254 gates with one ancestor, 225 with two ancestors, and 522 with three ancestors.
There are 405 nodes that are at least 99% of H(P )max, 440 that are at least 95% of
H(P )max, and 492 that are at least 90% of H(P )max. The average node ancestral
entropy is 1.023. All original gates in the circuit are replaced at least once. Figures
A.31 and A.32 illustrate this.
4.1.6.2 Five ‘Split’ Inputs Circuit Experiments. The five ‘split’ input
circuit has 355 levels with 102 of them equivalent to H(P )max, 231 of the levels have
an entropy value of at least one. The average output ancestral entropy value at the
1000th iteration is 1.58, and is 1.56 at the 500th iteration. There are 116 gates with
one ancestor, 524 with two ancestors, and 467 with three ancestors. There are 152
nodes that are at least 99% of H(P )max, 339 that are at least 95% of H(P )max, and
429 that are at least 90% of H(P )max. All original gates in the the circuit have been
replaced at least once. Figures A.33 and A.34 illustrate this.
4.1.6.3 Eleven Inputs Experiment. This circuit has 391 levels with an
average level ancestral entropy value of 1.264. 374 of the levels are at least zero, and
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299 are at least one. The output ancestral entropy reaches 1.58 at the 409th iteration
and is H(P )max at the 1000
th iteration. There are 131 gates with one circuit ancestor,
194 gates with two ancestors, and 687 gates with three ancestors. All original gates
in the circuit have been replaced at least once. Figures A.35 and A.36 illustrate this.
4.1.7 Series Circuits Results Summary. These results illustrate the func-
tion performed by each algorithm. Since the component hiding properties are of in-
terest, any further examination of the FixedLevelTwoGates, LargestLevelTwoGates
and OutputLevelTwoGates algorithms is excluded. The FixedLevelTwoGates and
OutputLevelTwoGates algorithms extrude new gates from the bottom of the circuit
while many of the components to hide are left untouched. The OutputLevelTwoGates
algorithm can produce the full range of ancestral entropy values at the outputs based
on how the sub-circuits are defined, while affecting few or none of the original sub-
circuits. The LargestLevelTwoGates algorithm introduces gates to the largest level,
while making few changes to other parts of the circuit. Figure 4.3-4.5 show the con-
fidence intervals for the results of each algorithm and circuit configuration.
The results of RandomLevelTwoGates, RandomTwoGates and RandomAlgo-
rithm are similar and don’t focus circuit transformations on one part of the circuit.
These algorithms replace most or all of the original gates in the circuits at least
once, which is necessary to hide circuit components. The confidence intervals for
the percentage of original gates remaining in the circuit is illustrated in Figure 4.6.
The results of the RandomAlgorithm experiments are not significantly different than
the RandomTwoGates and RandomLevelTwoGates results for the five input average
output level ancestral entropy, the 11 input average output and circuit level ances-
tral entropy and for the five ‘split’ input node and circuit level average ancestral
entropy. In the four remaining experiments the results are significantly different than
RandomTwoGates and RandomLevelTwoGates and the entropy values are higher.
A 2-Sample t test is performed comparing RandomAlgorithm against RandomT-
woGates and RandomLevelTwoGates. Resulting boxplots are shown in Figures 4.7-
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(a) Output Ancestral Entropy Results
(b) Node Ancestral Entropy Results
(c) Circuit Level Ancestral Entropy Results
Figure 4.3: Average Ancestral Entropy Intervals for 5 Input Series Circuit (a), (b)
and (c)
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(a) Output Ancestral Entropy Results
(b) Node Ancestral Entropy Results
(c) Circuit Level Ancestral Entropy Results
Figure 4.4: Average Ancestral Entropy Intervals for 5 Split Input Series Circuit (a),
(b) and (c)
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(a) Output Ancestral Entropy Results
(b) Node Ancestral Entropy Results
(c) Circuit Level Ancestral Entropy Results
Figure 4.5: Average Ancestral Entropy Intervals for 11 Input Series Circuit (a), (b)
and (c)
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(a) Percentage of Original gates in 5 Input Circuits
(b) Percentage of Original gates in 5 Split Input Cir-
cuits
(c) Percentage of Original gates in 11 Input Circuits
Figure 4.6: Percentage of Original Gates in Series Circuits (a), (b) and (c)
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(a) Boxplot for 5 Input Circuits
(b) Boxplot for 5 Split Input Circuits
(c) Boxplot for 11 Input Circuits
Figure 4.7: Boxplot from 2-Sample t Test of Average Output Ancestral Entropy with
Random Algorithms on Series Circuits (a), (b) and (c)
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(a) Boxplot for 5 Input Circuits
(b) Boxplot for 5 Split Input Circuits
(c) Boxplot for 11 Input Circuits
Figure 4.8: Boxplot from 2-Sample t Test of Average Node Ancestral Entropy with
Random Algorithms on Series Circuits (a), (b) and (c)
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(a) Boxplot for 5 Input Circuits
(b) Boxplot for 5 Split Input Circuits
(c) Boxplot for 11 Input Circuits
Figure 4.9: Boxplot from 2-Sample t Test of Average Level Ancestral Entropy with
Random Algorithms on Series Circuits (a), (b) and (c)
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Table 4.2: P-Values from 2-Sample t Test comparing RandomAlgorithm against Ran-
domTwoGates and RandomLevelTwoGates Using Series Circuits
Entropy 5 Input 5 ‘Split’ Input 11 Input
Output Level .137 .273 .136
Node .005 .595 .002
Circuit Level .013 .459 0.000
4.9. Table 4.2 contains the p values from the 2-Sample t test. RandomAlgorithm
performs significantly better than RandomTwoGates and RandomLevelTwoGates in
terms of node and circuit level ancestral entropy for the 5 and 11 Input experiments.
4.2 Three Gate Replacement C-17 Parallel Circuits
The parallel C-17 circuits show how independent or geographically separated
circuits are hidden by taking advantage of circuit merging during the creation of the
circuit variants. Figure 4.10 shows the high level parallel circuit configurations. The
algorithms perform the same function as described earlier.
(a) Independent Inputs (b) Shared Inputs
Figure 4.10: C-17 Parallel Circuits
(a) and (b)
The shared input circuit in Figure 4.10(b) is composed of three C-17 sub-circuits,
all using the same five inputs. The outputs of each sub-circuit are routed through a
series of AND gates providing two circuit outputs.
64
The parallel circuits are three independent C-17 circuits with independent in-
puts. This configuration is chosen because these circuits represent like circuits that
are unrelated geographically separated circuits. Figure 4.10(a) illustrates this circuit
configuration.
4.2.1 FixedLevelRandomTwoGates.
4.2.1.1 Shared Inputs. The final circuit variant has 253 levels. The
average ancestral entropy for each level is 1.86. Three levels have an average ancestral
entropy value of zero (all original gates), 11 levels have an average number of ancestors
from one original sub-circuit, 10 from two sub-circuits, and 229 levels from three sub-
circuits. The average output ancestral entropy is zero because the fixed level is set
to one, so the outputs are never selected for replacement. There are 33 nodes in the
circuit with only one ancestor from an original sub-circuit, 44 with two ancestors, 69
with three ancestors, and 881 with four ancestors. This information may be misleading
because much of the original circuit is retained, but all new gates with four ancestors
are extruded from the bottom of the circuit. The average node ancestral entropy is
1.99, while theH(P )max value for this four component circuit equals 2, 830 nodes have
an ancestral entropy of at least 99% of H(P )max, while 881 nodes have an ancestral
entropy of at least 95% of H(P )max. The circuit contains 16 of the 22 original gates.
These results are illustrated in Figure B.6.
4.2.1.2 Individual Inputs. In this circuit there are 143 levels. The
average ancestral entropy for each level is 1.376. Six levels have an entropy value of
zero (one ancestor), 14 levels have an average ancestral entropy value between zero
and one (ancestry values from two sub-circuits), while 124 have an entropy value
greater than one (ancestry values from three sub-circuits). There are 89 nodes with
only one sub-circuit ancestor, 45 nodes with two ancestors and 899 nodes with three
ancestors. 839 nodes have an ancestral entropy of at least 99% of H(P )max, while
892 nodes have an ancestral entropy of at least 95% of H(P )max and 898 nodes have
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an ancestral entropy of at least 90% of H(P )max. The circuit contains 11 of the 18
original gates. These results are illustrated in Figures B.3 and B.4.
4.2.2 OutputLevelRandomTwoGates.
4.2.2.1 Shared Inputs. There are 143 levels in this circuit. The average
level ancestral entropy for all levels is 1.525, while H(P )max = 2 for this circuit. Four
levels have an entropy value of zero, 18 have an entropy value of one, and 451 have an
entropy value between one and 1.585 which is the H(P )max value for a 3 component
circuit. The output ancestral entropy average is 1.585 at the 1000th iteration, and
reaches it at the 868th iteration. There are 29 gates in the circuit with only one sub-
circuit ancestor, 31 with two ancestors and 967 with three ancestors. There are no
nodes with all four ancestors. Because the gates selected for replacement come from
the bottom two levels of the graph, 18 of the 22 original gates remain in the circuit.
These results are illustrated in Figures B.5 and B.6.
4.2.2.2 Individual Inputs. This circuit has 186 levels with an average
ancestral entropy for all levels of 1.42. There are 7 levels with an ancestral entropy
value equal to zero, 11 levels with a value of one, and 168 levels with an entropy value
greater than one. The average output ancestral entropy reaches H(P )max at the
640th iteration. There are 72 nodes with one sub-circuit ancestor, 43 nodes with two
ancestors and 918 nodes with three ancestors, 863 nodes have an ancestral entropy of
at least 99% of H(P )max, while 917 nodes have an ancestral entropy of at least 95% of
H(P )max and 918 nodes have an ancestral entropy of at least 90% of H(P )max. The
circuit contains 12 of the 18 original gates. These results are illustrated in Figures
B.7 and B.8.
4.2.3 LargestLevelRandomTwoGates.
4.2.3.1 Shared Inputs. This circuit has 63 levels with an average
ancestral entropy for all levels of .814. There are 7 levels with an ancestral entropy
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value of zero, 27 levels with a value between zero and one, and 29 levels greater than
one. The output ancestral entropy equals zero because the output gates are never
replaced. There are 220 nodes with only one sub-circuit ancestor, 338 nodes with two
ancestors, and 465 nodes with three ancestors. Although H(P )max for this circuit is 2,
the maximum entropy value that can be reached is 1.585 because there are no nodes
in this circuit containing ancestors from all original sub-circuits. 15 of 22 original
gates remain in the circuit. These results are illustrated in Figures B.9 and B.10.
4.2.3.2 Individual Inputs. There are 64 levels in this circuit with an
average ancestral entropy for all levels of 1.025. There are four levels with an ancestral
entropy value of zero, 25 levels with a value between zero and one, and 35 levels with
a value greater than one. Again, the output ancestral entropy equals zero because the
output gates are never replaced, 404 nodes have an ancestral entropy of at least 99%
of H(P )max, while 620 nodes have an ancestral entropy of at least 95% of H(P )max
and 624 nodes have an ancestral entropy of at least 90% of H(P )max; 10 of 18 original
gates remain in the circuits. These results are illustrated in Figures B.11 and B.12.
4.2.4 RandomLevelTwoGates.
4.2.4.1 Shared Inputs. There are 227 levels in this circuit with an
average ancestral entropy for all levels of .989. There are 17 levels with an ances-
tral entropy value of zero (only one sub-circuit ancestor), 111 levels with a value
between zero and one (two sub-circuit ancestors), 59 levels with a value between 1
and 1.585 (three sub-circuit ancestors), and 40 levels with a value greater than 1.585
(four sub-circuit ancestors). The average output ancestral entropy is 1.96 after the
513th iteration (98% of H(P )max). There are 293 nodes with one sub-circuit ancestor,
336 nodes with two ancestors, 221 nodes with three ancestors and 153 nodes with
four ancestors. The average node ancestral entropy is .96; 63 nodes have an ancestral
entropy of at least 99% of H(P )max, while 142 nodes have an ancestral entropy of at
least 95% of H(P )max and 153 nodes have an ancestral entropy of at least 90% of
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H(P )max (all nodes with four ancestors have generally evenly balanced ancestry val-
ues). Only 1 of 22 original gates remains in the circuits. These results are illustrated
in Figures B.13 and B.14.
4.2.4.2 Individual Inputs. There are 188 levels with an average ances-
tral entropy for all levels of .73. There are 13 levels with an ancestral entropy value of
zero, 139 level with a value between zero and one, and 36 levels with a value greater
than one. The average output ancestral entropy is .9 after iteration 811 (56.7% of
H(P )max). There are 333 nodes with one ancestor, 430 nodes with two ancestors and
253 nodes with three ancestors. The average node ancestral entropy is .77. There
are 73 nodes with an ancestral entropy of at least 99% of H(P )max, while 176 nodes
have an ancestral entropy of at least 95% of H(P )max and 232 nodes have an ancestral
entropy of at least 90% of H(P )max. Only 1 of 18 original gates remains in the circuit.
These results are illustrated in Figures B.15 and B.16.
4.2.5 RandomTwoGates.
4.2.5.1 Shared Inputs. There are 355 levels with an average ancestral
entropy for all levels of .77. There are 56 levels with an ancestral entropy value of
zero, 202 levels with a value between zero and one, 90 levels with a value between
1 and 1.585 and 7 with a value greater than 1.585. The average output ancestral
entropy is 1.774 after the 875th iteration (88.5% of H(P )max). There are 384 nodes
with one sub-circuit ancestor, 407 nodes with two ancestors, 222 nodes with three
ancestors and 11 nodes with four ancestors. The average node ancestral entropy is
.725. No nodes have an ancestral entropy of at least 99% of H(P )max, while 11 nodes
have an ancestral entropy of at least 95% of H(P )max. All original gates in the circuit
have been replaced at least once. These results are illustrated in Figures B.17 and
B.18.
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4.2.5.2 Individual Inputs. There are 344 levels with an average an-
cestral entropy for all levels of .822. There are 25 levels with an ancestral entropy
value of zero, 218 levels with a value between zero and one and 101 levels with a
value greater than one. The average output ancestral entropy is 1.34 after the 991st
iteration (84.5% of H(P )max). There are 321 nodes with one sub-circuit ancestor,
394 nodes with two ancestors and 313 nodes with three ancestors. The average node
ancestral entropy is .81. There are 66 nodes with an ancestral entropy of at least 99%
of H(P )max, while 214 nodes have an ancestral entropy of at least 95% of H(P )max
and 263 nodes have an ancestral entropy of at least 90% of H(P )max. All original
gates have been replaced at least once. These results are illustrated in Figures B.19
and B.20.
4.2.6 RandomAlgorithm.
4.2.6.1 Shared Inputs. In this circuit there are 282 levels with an
average ancestral entropy for all levels of 1.21. There are 42 levels with an ancestral
entropy value of zero, 74 levels with a value between zero and one, 39 levels with
a value between 1 and 1.585 and 127 with a value greater than 1.585. The average
output ancestral entropy is 1.99 after iteration 875 (99.5% of H(P )max). There are
324 nodes with one sub-circuit ancestor, 141 nodes with two ancestors, 270 nodes
with three ancestors and 271 nodes with four ancestors. The average node ancestral
entropy is 1.05. 108 nodes have an ancestral entropy of at least 99% of H(P )max,
while 258 nodes have an ancestral entropy of at least 95% of H(P )max and 271 nodes
have an ancestral entropy at least 90% of H(P )max. All original gates in the circuit
have been replaced at least once. These results are illustrated in Figures B.21 and
B.22.
4.2.6.2 Individual Inputs. This circuit has 251 levels with an average
ancestral entropy for all levels of .905. There are 32 levels with an ancestral entropy
value of zero, 106 levels with a value between zero and one, and 113 levels with a
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value greater than one. The average output ancestral entropy is 1.58 after iteration
991 (99.7% of H(P )max). There are 259 nodes with one ancestor, 243 nodes with two
ancestors and 528 nodes with three ancestors. The average node ancestral entropy
is .997. 219 nodes have an ancestral entropy of at least 99% of H(P )max, while 391
nodes have an ancestral entropy of at least 95% of H(P )max and 451 nodes have an
ancestral entropy of at least 90% of H(P )max. All original gates in the circuit have
been replaced at least once. These results are illustrated in Figures B.23 and B.24.
4.2.7 Parallel Circuits Results Summary. These parallel circuit results il-
lustrate the functions performed by each algorithm. As with the series circuits the
component hiding properties are of greatest interest and any further examination
of the FixedLevelTwoGates, LargestLevelTwoGates and OutputLevelTwoGates algo-
rithms is excluded. Figure 4.11-4.12 illustrate the confidence intervals for the result
of each algorithm and circuit configuration.
These results are similar to the results in the series experiments. Random-
LevelTwoGates, RandomTwoGates and RandomAlgorithm, provide similar results
and don’t focus circuit transformations only one part of the circuit. In all three
experiments, RandomLevelTwoGates replaces all original nodes but one, while Ran-
domTwoGates and RandomAlgorithm replace all original nodes in the circuit. This
is a necessary attribute if a circuit is to have any component hiding properties. The
confidence intervals for the percentage of original gates remaining in the circuit is
illustrated in Figure 4.13.
A 2-Sample t test is performed comparing RandomAlgorithm to RandomLevelT-
woGates and RandomTwoGates. The resulting boxplots are shown in Figures 4.14-
4.16. Table 4.3 contains the p values from the 2-Sample t test. RandomAlgorithm is
significantly different than RandomLevelTwoGates and RandomTwoGates in terms
of circuit level entropy using the shared input circuit and in terms of output level
entropy using the individual input circuit. The shared input node entropy p value of
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Table 4.3: P-Values from 2-Sample t Test comparing RandomAlgorithm against Ran-
domTwoGates and RandomLevelTwoGates Using Parallel Circuits
Entropy Shared Input Individual Input
Output Level .267 .002
Node .060 .079
Circuit Level .019 .500
.060 is close to being different than the others, and more experiments are needed to
determine if this is better.
4.3 Three and Four Gate Replacement Circuit Reduction
Allowing redundant and symmetric gates as replacements causes many buffers
or constant output gates to be inserted into the circuit. The initial assumption is the
insertion of these buffers allows better circuit transformations in future experiment
iterations. However, this is not the case. In [9], Kim shows using a circuit reduction
algorithm and three gate replacement circuits that allow redundant and symmetric
gates can be nearly reduced back to the original circuit configuration. Figure 4.17,
shows a circuit variant after 1000 iterations using the RandomAlgorithm algorithm.
The original circuit contains 18 gates and the variant contains 1096 gates. Figure
4.18, illustrates the circuit variant after being reduced. This circuit contains only 123
gates. His results show performing fewer iterations to create the circuit variant allows
circuits to be reduced even closer to the original.
However, reducing circuit variants created with a two gate selection and four
gate replacement were unsuccessful. Figure 4.19 shows a circuit variant at the 1000th
iteration. Figure 4.20 illustrates the reduced circuit. The gate count in the original is
1096 gates, while the reduced version has 496. When using a two gate selection and
a four gate replacement it is not necessary to allow redundant or symmetric gates to
cause independent circuits to merge, resulting in a circuit that is not as easily reduced.
The next section examines the entropy properties of the algorithms when performing
four gate replacements.
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(a) Output Ancestral Entropy Results
(b) Node Ancestral Entropy Results
(c) Circuit Level Ancestral Entropy Results
Figure 4.11: Average Ancestral Entropy Intervals for Shared Input Parallel Circuit
(a), (b) and (c)
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(a) Output Ancestral Entropy Results
(b) Node Ancestral Entropy Results
(c) Circuit Level Ancestral Entropy Results
Figure 4.12: Average Ancestral Entropy Intervals for Individual Input Parallel Circuit
(a), (b) and (c)
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(a) Percentage of Original gates in Shared Input Circuits
(b) Percentage of Original gates in Individual Input Circuits
Figure 4.13: Percentage of Original Gates in Parallel Circuits (a) and (b)
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(a) Boxplot for Shared Input Parallel Circuits
(b) Boxplot for Individual Input Parallel Circuits
Figure 4.14: Boxplot from 2-Sample t Test of Average Output Ancestral Entropy with
Random Algorithms on Parallel Circuits (a) and (b)
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(a) Boxplot for Shared Input Parallel Circuits
(b) Boxplot for Individual Input Parallel Circuits
Figure 4.15: Boxplot from 2-Sample t Test of Average Output Ancestral Entropy with
Random Algorithms on Parallel Circuits (a) and (b)
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(a) Boxplot for Shared Input Parallel Circuits
(b) Boxplot for Individual Input Parallel Circuits
Figure 4.16: Boxplot from 2-Sample t Test of Average Output Ancestral Entropy with
Random Algorithms on Parallel Circuits (a) and (b)
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Figure 4.17: 3 Gate Replacement C-17 Circuit Variant at 1000 iterations
Figure 4.18: 3 Gate Replacement C-17 Circuit Reduced
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Figure 4.19: 4 Gate Replacement C-17 Circuit Variant at 1000 iterations
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Figure 4.20: 4 Gate Replacement C-17 Circuit Reduced
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4.4 Four Gate Replacement C-17 Series Circuits
The two gate selection with a four gate replacement experiments produce similar
entropy results as the three gate replacement experiments. This section illustrates the
confidence intervals and the boxplots for series and parallel four gate replacement cir-
cuits. The series circuits used here are the same circuits used in the three gate replace-
ment experiments. Four gate replacements are evaluated redundant and dual input
gates are not allowed to be introduced into the circuit. Since the FixedLevelTwoGate,
OutputLevelTwoGate and the LargestLevelTwoGate algorithms don’t remove many
of the of original gates of a circuit, they are not discussed here.
Comparing the four gate replacement results in Appendix C with the three gate
replacements in Appendix A, the four gate replacement experiments generally have
higher ancestral entropy results for the RandomLevelTwoGates, RandomTwoGates
and RandomAlgorithm experiments. These results are displayed in Tables 4.4-4.6.
The average ancestral entropy intervals and percentage for original gates for
each experiment are shown in Figures 4.21-4.24. These figures illustrate the aver-
age ancestral entropy for RandomAlgorithm is either greater or the same as Ran-
domTwoGates and RandomLevelTwoGates. In every experiment RandomAlgorithm
replaces all original gates in the circuit.
Boxplots from the 2-Sample t test comparing RandomAlgorithm against Ran-
domLevelTwoGates and RandomTwoGates are displayed in Figures 4.25-4.27. Table
4.7 contains the p values from the 2-Sample t test. RandomAlgorithm does not per-
form differently than RandomTwoGates and RandomLevelTwoGates for any four gate
replacement series experiment.
4.5 Four Gate Replacement C-17 Parallel Circuits
Tables 4.8-4.10 illustrate the relationship between the three and four gate re-
placement parallel circuits. From this, the RandomAlgorithm four gate replacement
experiments generally produce higher entropy values than its three gate counter part.
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Table 4.4: RandomLevelTwoGates 3 and 4 Gate Replacement Comparison, Series
Circuits
Average Ancestral Entropy Gates with
Inputs OutputLevel Circuit Level Node 3 Ancestors
3 5 1.18 .393 .36 63
5 ‘Split’ 1 .64 .633 57
11 1.584 .66 .71 150
4 5 1.547 .6844 .7796 228
5 ‘Split’ 1.4785 1.135 1.168 400
11 .97 .9132 .923 131
Table 4.5: RandomTwoGates 3 and 4 Gate Replacement Comparison, Series Circuits
Average Ancestral Entropy Gates with
Inputs OutputLevel Circuit Level Node 3 Ancestors
3 5 1.516 .169 .1567 63
5 ‘Split’ 1.56 1.126 1.118 598
11 1.516 .858 .858 304
4 5 1.501 .533 .495 11
5 ‘Split’ 1.541 1.122 1.083 338
11 1.584 1.17 .1.155 365
Table 4.6: RandomAlgorithm 3 and 4 Gate Replacement Comparison, Series Circuits
Average Ancestral Entropy Gates with
Inputs OutputLevel Circuit Level Node 3 Ancestors
3 5 1.585 1.356 1.024 522
5 ‘Split’ 1.581 1.585 1.107 467
11 1.584 1.265 1.227 687
4 5 1.578 .849 .869 281
5 ‘Split’ 1 1.056 1.057 209
11 1 .939 .994 176
Table 4.7: P-Values from 2-Sample t Test comparing RandomAlgorithm against Ran-
domTwoGates and RandomLevelTwoGates Using Series Circuits with a 4
Gate Replacement
Entropy 5 Input 5 ‘Split’ Input 11 Input
Output Level .316 .793 .715
Node .181 .343 .844
Circuit Level .085 .548 .485
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(a) Output Ancestral Entropy Results
(b) Node Ancestral Entropy Results
(c) Circuit Level Ancestral Entropy Results
Figure 4.21: Average Ancestral Entropy Intervals for 5 Input Series Circuit with a 4
Gate Replacement (a), (b) and (c)
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(a) Output Ancestral Entropy Results
(b) Node Ancestral Entropy Results
(c) Circuit Level Ancestral Entropy Results
Figure 4.22: Average Ancestral Entropy Intervals for 5 ‘Split’ Input Series Circuit
with a 4 Gate Replacement (a), (b) and (c)
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(a) Output Ancestral Entropy Results
(b) Node Ancestral Entropy Results
(c) Circuit Level Ancestral Entropy Results
Figure 4.23: Average Ancestral Entropy Intervals for 11 Input Series Circuit with a
4 Gate Replacement (a), (b) and (c)
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(a) Percentage of Original gates in 5 Input Circuits with a
4 Gate Replacement
(b) Percentage of Original gates in 5 ‘Split’ Input Circuits
(c) Percentage of Original gates in 11 Input Circuits
Figure 4.24: Percentage of Original Gates in Series Circuits with a 4 Gate Replace-
ment (a), (b) and (c)
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(a) Boxplot for 5 Input Series Circuits
(b) Boxplot for 5 Split Input Series Circuits
(c) Boxplot for 11 Input Series Circuits
Figure 4.25: Boxplot from 2-Sample t Test of Average Output Ancestral Entropy with
Random Algorithms on Series Circuits with a 4 Gate Replacement (a),
(b) and (c)
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(a) Boxplot for 5 Input Series Circuits
(b) Boxplot for 5 Split Input Series Circuits
(c) Boxplot for 11 Input Series Circuits
Figure 4.26: Boxplot from 2-Sample t Test of Average Node Ancestral Entropy with
Random Algorithms on Series Circuits with a 4 Gate Replacement (a),
(b) and (c)
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(a) Boxplot for 5 Input Series Circuits
(b) Boxplot for 5 Split Input Series Circuits
(c) Boxplot for 11 Input Series Circuits
Figure 4.27: Boxplot from 2-Sample t Test of AverageLevel Ancestral Entropy with
Random Algorithms on Series Circuits with a 4 Gate Replacement (a),
(b) and (c)
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Comparing the four gate replacement charts in Appendix C with the three gate re-
placement charts in Appendix B it appears the random algorithm four gate replace-
ment produces higher ancestral entropy than the three gate replacement experiments.
Table 4.11 contains the p values from the 2-Sample t test comparing RandomA-
lgorithm against RandomTwoGates and RandomLevelTwoGates. RandomAlgorithm
is significantly different than the other two algorithms in 4 of the 6 values.
Table 4.8: RandomLevelTwoGates 3 and 4 Gate Replacement Comparison, Parallel
Circuits
Average Ancestral Entropy Gates with
Inputs OutputLevel Circuit Level Node Max # Ancestors
3 Shared 1.9635 .9893 .9647 153
Individual .9032 .7322 .7788 253
4 Shared .9685 .996 1.049 87
Individual .5715 .8584 .8633 54
Table 4.9: RandomTwoGates 3 and 4 Gate Replacement Comparison, Parallel Cir-
cuits
Average Ancestral Entropy Gates with
Inputs OutputLevel Circuit Level Node Max # Ancestors
3 Shared 1.344 .8222 .8128 313
Individual 1.774 .7736 .725 11
4 Shared 1.684 .5257 .5536 3
Individual 1.0383 1.233 1.2185 418
Table 4.10: RandomAlgorithm 3 and 4 Gate Replacement Comparison, Parallel Cir-
cuits
Average Ancestral Entropy Gates with
Inputs OutputLevel Circuit Level Node Max # Ancestors
3 Shared 1.9932 1.206 1.0536 271
Individual 1.5814 .9046 .9974 528
4 Shared 1.999 1.0353 .9676 203
Individual 1.568 1.0659 1.1215 373
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Table 4.11: P-Values from 2-Sample t Test comparing RandomAlgorithm against
RandomTwoGates and RandomLevelTwoGates Using Parallel Circuits
with a 4 Gate Replacement
Entropy Shared Input Individual Input
Output Level .028 .003
Node .001 .704
Circuit Level .001 .443
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(a) Output Ancestral Entropy Results
(b) Node Ancestral Entropy Results
(c) Circuit Level Ancestral Entropy Results
Figure 4.28: Average Ancestral Entropy Intervals for Shared Input Parallel Circuit
with a 4 Gate Replacement (a), (b) and (c)
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(a) Output Ancestral Entropy Results
(b) Node Ancestral Entropy Results
(c) Circuit Level Ancestral Entropy Results
Figure 4.29: Average Ancestral Entropy Intervals for Individual Input Parallel Circuit
with a 4 Gate Replacement (a), (b) and (c)
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(a) Boxplot for Shared Input Parallel Circuits
(b) Boxplot for Individual Input Parallel Circuits
Figure 4.30: Boxplotfrom 2-Sample t Test of Average Output Ancestral Entropy with
Random Algorithms on Four Gate Replacement Parallel Circuits (a) and
(b)
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(a) Boxplot for Shared Input Parallel Circuits
(b) Boxplot for Individual Input Parallel Circuits
Figure 4.31: Boxplot from 2-Sample t Test of Average Node Ancestral Entropy with
Random Algorithms on Four Gate Replacement Parallel Circuits (a) and
(b)
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(a) Boxplot for Shared Input Parallel Circuits
(b) Boxplot for Individual Input Parallel Circuits
Figure 4.32: Boxplot from 2-Sample t Test of Average Level Ancestral Entropy with
Random Algorithms on Four Gate Replacement Parallel Circuits (a) and
(b)
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Table 4.12: Reduction Results
Iteration: 300 100 300 100
RandomAlgorithm H(P ) Gate Reduction(original → reduced)
2-4 Duplicate and Redundant Gates
Series .641 .646 617→175 218→61
Parallel .78 .32 611→101 218→32
2-4, No Duplicate or Redundant Gates
Series .87 .67 614→473 218→168
Parallel 1.12 .71 618→414 218→145
4.6 Validation
An immediate independent validation tool is Kim’s [9] reduction software. This
reduction tool was designed knowing how CORGI generates gate replacements. The
expectation is circuits with higher ancestral entropy will reduce less than circuits with
low ancestral entropy. Also, given a circuit with independent components (i.e., the
independent input parallel circuit) and a circuit variant that reduces to independent
components the ancestral entropy should be less than the ancestral entropy of a circuit
that does not reduce to independent components.
Table 4.12 displays the results of reduction on the two series and parallel cir-
cuit variants created using RandomAlgorithm with a two gate selection and a four
gate replacement. Circuits with higher entropy do reduce less. Both the 100 and
300 iteration series circuit allowing duplicate inputs and redundant gates have a 72%
reduction and a 23% reduction when they are not allowed. Both the 100 and 300 iter-
ation parallel circuit allowing duplicate inputs and redundant gates have a reduction
of approximately 85%. When duplicate inputs and redundant gates are not allowed
there is only an approximate reduction of 33%. This supports the expectation that
circuits with higher ancestral entropy reduce less.
Circuits also should require less iterations to be performed before the reducer
fails to separate the circuit into independent components. Starting with the circuit in
Figure 4.33 several circuit variants are created allowing duplicate inputs and redun-
dant gates. As displayed in Figures 4.34 and 4.35, at the 19th iteration of creating
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the variant (H(P ) = .0247) the circuit is reduced to three independent components
and at the 28th iteration (H(P ) = .078) the reducer cannot separate the variant into
multiple independent components. When disallowing duplicate inputs and redundant
gates the reducer separates the 18th iteration (H(P ) = .178) into three independent
components and cannot separate it after the 24th iteration (H(P ) = .212) and are
illustrated in Figures 4.36 and 4.37.
Although this is just one example it appears that circuits with higher ancestral
entropy are more difficult to reduce to individual components than circuits with lower
entropy. More experiments must be performed to verify this.
Figure 4.33: Baseline Individual Input Parallel C-17 Circuit
4.7 Summary
These results show that RandomAlgorithm creates circuit variants with higher
average ancestral entropy values at the outputs, circuit levels, and for every node in
the circuit than the other CORGI algorithms. RandomTwoGates performed nearly
as well or better than RandomAlgorithm in some cases. More experiments need to be
performed to determine if one is truly better than the other based on whether removing
original sub-circuits in early iterations will cause the ancestral entropy values to be
lower. However, these two algorithms outperform the other CORGI algorithms in
terms of providing component hiding characteristics to a circuit variant.
High Ancestral entropy and the ability to reduce a circuit appear to have a direct
correlation. Circuits with higher ancestral entropy were not reduced as well as other
and were more difficult to separate the parallel circuit into independent components.
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(a) Circuit Variant at Iteration 19 (b) Reduced Variant
Figure 4.34: Reducing C-17 Parallel Circuit with Duplicate Inputs and Redundant
Gates to Independent Components
(a) and (b)
(a) Circuit Variant at Iteration 28 (b) Reduced Variant
Figure 4.35: Reducing C-17 Parallel Circuit with Duplicate Inputs and Redundant
GatesOne Iteration Before Component Separation
(a) and (b)
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(a) Circuit Variant at Iteration 18 (b) Reduced Variant
Figure 4.36: Reducing C-17 Parallel Circuit with No Duplicate Inputs or Redundant
Gates to Independent Components
(a) and (b)
(a) Circuit Variant at Iteration 25 (b) Reduced Variant
Figure 4.37: Reducing C-17 Parallel Circuit with No Duplicate Inputs or Redundant
Gates One Iteration Before Component Separation
(a) and (b)
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V. Conclusions
This chapter discusses the contribution of this research and future work.
5.1 Goals and Hypothesis
The terms component hiding and ancestral entropy are defined and described
using ancestral entropy as a measure of component hiding. The iterative selection and
replacement algorithms are assumed to provide measurable component hiding prop-
erties, resulting in the circuit transformations not being easily undone by a circuit
reducer (or a reverse engineer). Series and parallel combinational circuits with differ-
ent configurations are compared and the component hiding properties are identified.
5.2 Contributions
5.2.1 Component Hiding Effectiveness. Ancestral entropy measures the
uncertainty a node or gate in a circuit derived from a specific sub-circuit. The ances-
tral entropy is calculated for each node, the average at each level in the circuit, and
the average at the output nodes. These entropy values provide useful information
to compare the effectiveness of the selection and replacement algorithms in terms of
component hiding. It also provides the data necessary for creating the colors in the
graphs used in this research.
5.2.2 Introduction of the Colored Graphs. The colored graphs are an im-
provement over the current graphs output by the CORGI. The the use of colors,
shape, numbers and ancestry values allow for a quick, visual description of what each
iteration of an algorithm is doing. Circuit merging and removal is easily identified by
the introduction or removal of a color from the graph. The graph coloring process
also creates a file identifying the iteration number when a new color is introduced in
the graph and when a color is removed from the graph. It defines what color nodes
are present, how many nodes of each color, and the total number of nodes for each
iteration. Providing a shape for each node provides an immediate indication of the
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gate operation and aids in the identification of buffer circuits that could easily be
reduced. Adding the node number, gate type, and ancestry information to each node
label adds a trace capability back to the BENCH and ancestry files to verify proper
operation of the selection and replacement algorithm, the ancestry algorithm, and the
entropy algorithm developed in this research.
5.3 Future Work
5.3.1 Color Graph Improvements. The appearance of the colored graphs
could be further improved with the implementation of a red, blue and green (RBG)
or similar coloring scheme. Using the ancestry values as weighted color values will
provide graphs that show color variations and visually indicate the ancestors, and the
weight of the ancestry, of each node in the circuit. The current implementation does
not allow coloring of the optimized circuits when using the CORGI circuit reducing
program. This improvement will provide a visual representation of the reduced circuits
and will be useful in analyzing them.
5.3.2 Execute at Runtime. The current implementation for computing an-
cestry, entropy and coloring the graphs are all done by reading files created during
the initial execution of the algorithm. Although this is done intentionally for use on
previous experiments, it is worthwhile to perform these functions during runtime. It is
also worthwhile to add the option to include or not include computing these functions
during the experiment, due to the increase in runtime.
5.3.3 Modify FixedLevelTwoGates Algorithm. The fixed level in FixedLevelT-
woGates algorithm is selectable by the user. It is beneficial, especially since Rando-
mAlgorithm is likely to be the best algorithm for component hiding, to have the
ability to set the fixed level to the level below the input level. A modification to
have the first gate selected from the levelmax − 1 and the second gate from either
levelmax−1 or levelmax−2 is needed. This will cause the RandomAlgorithm to select
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gates for replacement in a more uniform manner by not having two algorithms make
replacements at or near the output level. Allowing replacements to be made near
the input level will most likely provide better component hiding properties than the
current implementation
5.3.4 Validation. To validate the reduction tool works properly and that
ancestral entropy is a viable measurement for component hiding we need to test
the circuit variants against commercial circuit reducing tools. Kim’s algorithm [9]
may or may not provide enough reduction to determine if the four gate replacement
experiments provide component hiding attributes. In an ideal setting reverse engineers
would be used to determine the ease of reducing any circuit variants and identifying
weaknesses in the creation of the circuit variants.
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Appendix A. Three Gate Replacement Series Circuit Variant Graphs
and Charts
This appendix contains the graphs and charts for the series circuits discussed inChapter IV. These charts and graphs are from one experiment only and are
provided to show trends of each algorithm.
(a) Iteration 0 (b) Iteration 20 (c) Iteration 50 (d) Iteration 100
Figure A.1: FixedLevelTwoGates 5 Input C-17 Series Variant Circuits
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
input
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure A.2: FixedLevelTwoGates 5 Input C-17 Series - Iteration 1000
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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(a) Iteration 0 (b) Iteration 20 (c) Iteration 50 (d) Iteration 100
Figure A.3: FixedLevelTwoGates 5 ‘Split’ Input C-17 Series Variant Circuits
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure A.4: FixedLevelTwoGates 5 ‘Split’ Input C-17 Series - Iteration 1000
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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(a) Iteration 0 (b) Iteration 20 (c) Iteration 50 (d) Iteration 100
Figure A.5: FixedLevelTwoGates 11 Input C-17 Series Variant Circuits
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure A.6: FixedLevelTwoGates 11 Input C-17 Series - Iteration 1000
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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(a) Iteration 0 (b) Iteration 20 (c) Iteration 50 (d) Iteration 100
Figure A.7: OutputLevelTwoGates 5 Input C-17 Series Variant Circuits
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure A.8: OutputLevelTwoGates 5 Input C-17 Series - Iteration 1000
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
111
(a) Iteration 0 (b) Iteration 20 (c) Iteration 50 (d) Iteration 100
Figure A.9: OutputLevelTwoGates 5 ‘Split’ Input C-17 Series Variant Circuits
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure A.10: OutputLevelTwoGates 5 ‘Split’ Input C-17 Series - Iteration 1000
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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(a) Iteration 0 (b) Iteration 20 (c) Iteration 50 (d) Iteration 100
Figure A.11: OutputLevelTwoGates 11 Input C-17 Series Variant Circuits
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure A.12: OutputLevelTwoGates 11 Input C-17 Series - Iteration 1000
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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(a) Iteration 0 (b) Iteration 20 (c) Iteration 50
(d) Iteration 100 (e) Iteration 200
Figure A.13: LargestLevelTwoGates 5 Input C-17 Series Variant Circuits
(a),(b),(c), (d), and (e)
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure A.14: LargestLevelTwoGates 5 Input C-17 Series - Iteration 1000
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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(a) Iteration 0 (b) Iteration 20 (c) Iteration 50
(d) Iteration 100 (e) Iteration 200
Figure A.15: LargestLevelTwoGates 5 ‘Split’ Input C-17 Series Variant Circuits
(a),(b),(c), (d), and (d)
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure A.16: LargestLevelTwoGates 5 ‘Split’ Input C-17 Series - Iteration 1000
(a),(b),(c), and (d)
119
(a) Iteration 0 (b) Iteration 20 (c) Iteration 50
(d) Iteration 100 (e) Iteration 200
Figure A.17: LargestLevelTwoGates 11 Input C-17 Series Variant Circuits
(a),(b),(c), (d), and (e)
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure A.18: LargestLevelTwoGates 11 Input C-17 Series - Iteration 1000
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Figure A.19: RandomLevelTwoGates 5 Input C-17 Series Variant Circuits
(a),(b),(c), (d), and (e)
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Figure A.20: RandomLevelTwoGates 5 Input C-17 Series - Iteration 500
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Figure A.21: RandomLevelTwoGates 5 ‘Split’ Input C-17 Series Variant Circuits
(a),(b),(c), (d), and (d)
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Figure A.22: RandomLevelTwoGates 5 ‘Split’ Input C-17 Series - Iteration 500
(a),(b),(c), and (d)
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Figure A.23: RandomLevelTwoGates 11 Input C-17 Series Variant Circuits
(a),(b),(c), (d), and (e)
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Figure A.24: RandomLevelTwoGates 11 Input C-17 Series - Iteration 500
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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Figure A.25: RandomTwoGates 5 Input C-17 Series Variant Circuits
(a),(b),(c), (d), and (e)
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Figure A.26: RandomTwoGates 5 Input C-17 Series - Iteration 1000
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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Figure A.27: RandomTwoGates 5 ‘Split’ Input C-17 Series Variant Circuits
(a),(b),(c), (d), and (d)
130
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure A.28: RandomTwoGates 5 ‘Split’ Input C-17 Series - Iteration 1000
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Figure A.29: RandomTwoGates 11 Input C-17 Series Variant Circuits
(a),(b),(c), (d), and (e)
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Figure A.30: RandomTwoGates 11 Input C-17 Series - Iteration 1000
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Figure A.31: RandomAlgorithm 5 Input C-17 Series Variant Circuits
(a),(b),(c), (d), and (e)
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Figure A.32: Random Algorithm 5 Input C-17 Series - Iteration 1000
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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Figure A.33: RandomAlgorithm 5 ‘Split’ Input C-17 Series Variant Circuits
(a),(b),(c), (d), and (d)
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Figure A.34: RandomAlgorithm 5 ‘Split’ Input C-17 Series - Iteration 500
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Figure A.35: RandomAlgorithm 11 Input C-17 Series Variant Circuits
(a),(b),(c), (d), and (e)
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Figure A.36: RandomAlgorithm 11 Input C-17 Series - Iteration 1000
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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Appendix B. Three Gate Replacement Parallel Circuit Variant
Graphs and Charts
This appendix contains the graphs and charts for the parallel circuits discussedin Chapter IV. These charts and graphs are from one experiment only and are
provided to show trends of each algorithm.
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Figure B.1: FixedLevelTwoGates Shared Input C-17 Parallel Variant Circuits
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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Figure B.2: FixedLevelTwoGates Shared Input C-17 Parallel - Iteration 1000
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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Figure B.3: FixedLevelTwoGates Individual Input C-17 Parallel Variant Circuits
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Figure B.4: FixedLevelTwoGates Individual Input C-17 Parallel - Iteration 1000
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Figure B.5: OutputLevelTwoGates Shared Input C-17 Parallel Variant Circuits
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Figure B.6: OutputLevelTwoGates Shared Input C-17 Parallel - Iteration 1000
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Figure B.7: OutputLevelTwoGates Individual Input C-17 Parallel Variant Circuits
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Figure B.8: OutputLevelTwoGates Individual Input C-17 Parallel - Iteration 1000
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Figure B.9: LargestLevelTwoGates Shared Input C-17 Parallel Variant Circuits
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Figure B.10: LargestLevelTwoGates Shared Input C-17 Parallel - Iteration 1000
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Figure B.11: LargestLevelTwoGates Individual Input C-17 Parallel Variant Circuits
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150
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure B.12: LargestLevelTwoGates Individual Input C-17 Parallel - Iteration 1000
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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Figure B.13: RandomLevelTwoGates Shared Input C-17 Parallel Variant Circuits
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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Figure B.14: RandomLevelTwoGates Shared Input C-17 Parallel - Iteration 1000
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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Figure B.15: RandomLevelTwoGates Individual Input C-17 Parallel Variant Circuits
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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Figure B.16: RandomLevelTwoGates Individual Input C-17 Parallel - Iteration 1000
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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Figure B.17: RandomTwoGates Shared Input C-17 Parallel Variant Circuits
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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Figure B.18: RandomTwoGates Shared Input C-17 Parallel - Iteration 1000
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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Figure B.19: RandomTwoGates Individual Input C-17 Parallel Variant Circuits
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Figure B.20: RandomTwoGates Individual Input C-17 Parallel - Iteration 1000
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
159
(a) Iteration 0 (b) Iteration 20 (c) Iteration 50
(d) Iteration 100
Figure B.21: RandomAlgorithm Shared Input C-17 Parallel Variant Circuits
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Figure B.22: RandomAlgorithm Shared Input C-17 Parallel - Iteration 1000
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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Figure B.23: RandomAlgorithm Individual Input C-17 Parallel Variant Circuits
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Figure B.24: RandomAlgorithm Individual Input C-17 Parallel - Iteration 1000
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
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Appendix C. Four Gate Replacement Series and Parallel Circuit
Variant Charts and Graphs
This appendix contains the graphs and charts for the four gate replacement seriesand parallel circuits discussed in Chapter IV. These charts and graphs are from
one experiment only and are provided to show trends of each algorithm.
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Figure C.1: RandomLevelTwoGates 5 Input C-17 Series 4 Gate Replacement - Itera-
tion 1000
(a),(b),(c) and (d)
164
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure C.2: RandomLevelTwoGates 5 ‘Split’ Input C-17 Series 4 Gate Replacement
- Iteration 1000
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Figure C.5: RandomTwoGates 5 ‘Split’ Input C-17 Series 4 Gate Replacement - It-
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Figure C.6: Random Two Gate 11 Input C-17 Series 4 Gate Replacement - Iteration
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Figure C.7: RandomAlgorithm 5 Input C-17 Series 4 Gate Replacement - Iteration
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Figure C.8: RandomAlgorithm 5 ‘Split’ Input C-17 Series 4 Gate Replacement - It-
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Figure C.9: RandomAlgorithm 11 Input C-17 Series 4 Gate Replacement - Iteration
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Figure C.10: 4 Gate Replacement RandomLevelTwoGates Individual Input C-17 Par-
allel - Iteration 1000
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Figure C.11: 4 Gate RandomTwoGates Individual Input C-17 Parallel - Iteration 1000
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Figure C.12: 4 Gate RandomAlgorithm Individual Input C-17 Parallel - Iteration
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Figure C.13: 4 Gate RandomLevelTwoGates Shared Input C-17 Parallel - Iteration
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Figure C.14: 4 Gate RandomTwoGates Shared Input C-17 Parallel - Iteration 1000
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Figure C.15: 4 Gate RandomAlgorithm Shared Input C-17 Parallel - Iteration 1000
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